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ALGORITHMIC  LEGAL  METRICS
Dan L. Burk*
Predictive algorithms are increasingly being deployed in a variety of settings to determine
legal status.  Algorithmic predictions have been used to determine provision of health care and
social services, to allocate state resources, and to anticipate criminal behavior or activity.  Further
applications have been proposed to determine civil and criminal liability or to “personalize” legal
default rules.  Deployment of such artificial intelligence (AI) systems has properly raised questions
of algorithmic bias, fairness, transparency, and due process.  But little attention has been paid to
the known sociological costs of using predictive algorithms to determine legal status.  A large and
growing social science literature teaches the effects of “algorithmic living,” documenting how
humans interact with machine generated assessments.  Many of these interactions are socially
detrimental, and such corrosive effects are greatly amplified by the increasing speed and ubiquity
of digitally automated algorithmic systems.
In this Article I link the sociological and legal analysis of AI, highlighting the reflexive
social processes that are engaged by algorithmic metrics.  This Article examines these overlooked
social effects of predictive legal algorithms and contributes to the literature a vital fundamental
but missing critique of such analytics.  Specifically, this Article shows how the problematic social
effects of algorithmic legal metrics extend far beyond the concerns about accuracy that have thus
far dominated critiques of such metrics.  Second, it demonstrates that corrective governance mech-
anisms such as enhanced due process or transparency will be inadequate to remedy such corrosive
effects, and that some such remedies, such as transparency, may actually exacerbate the worst
effects of algorithmic governmentality.  Third, the Article shows that the application of
algorithmic metrics to legal decisions aggravates the latent tensions between equity and autonomy
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in liberal institutions, undermining democratic values in a manner and on a scale not previ-
ously experienced by human societies.  Illuminating these effects casts new light on the inherent
social costs of AI metrics, particularly the perverse effects of deploying algorithms in legal systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Automated pattern analysis and decisionmaking, colloquially designated
as “artificial intelligence” or “AI,” is increasingly being deployed to mediate
or to assist in social determinations across a range of domains including gov-
ernance and regulatory decisions.1  As potential applications for algorithmic
legal decisionmaking grow, optimistic visions of such systems foresee the rise
of accurate and efficient AI regulators, free from the errors of human deci-
sionmakers.2  More pessimistic visions foresee the imposition of impersonal
and regimented machine discipline on an unsuspecting populace.3
1 See Adrian Mackenzie, The Production of Prediction: What Does Machine Learning Want?,
18 EUR. J. CULTURAL STUD. 429, 430 (2015); Monika Zalnieriute, Lyria Bennett Moses &
George Williams, The Rule of Law and Automation of Government Decision-Making, 82 MOD. L.
REV. 425, 427–28 (2019).
2 See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1155 (2017) [hereinafter Coglianese &
Lehr, Regulating by Robot] (arguing that governmental reliance on machine learning
should be approached with measured optimism); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Trans-
parency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2019) [hereinafter Cog-
lianese & Lehr, Transparency] (arguing that algorithmic governance can be transparent,
accurate, and efficient); Zalnieriute et al., supra note 1, at 454 (summarizing the potential
benefits of automated decisionmaking); see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH
CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK
30–32 (2013) (touting the supposed accuracy and comprehensiveness of “Big Data”
analyses).
3 See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PRO-
FILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUC-
TION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); FRANK
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND
INFORMATION (2015); see also Karen Yeung, Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation, 12
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Despite the confluence of such algorithmic hope and dread, both public
and private legal functions are increasingly the subjects for algorithmic provi-
sion.4  Predictive algorithms have been deployed to identify families at risk of
abusive behavior, in order to mobilize social services intervention before
actual harm occurs.5  Predictive algorithms have been relied upon to assess
the threat of criminal recidivism, and so determine the allowance for bail or
for prisoner parole.6  Predictive algorithms are being incorporated into
policing strategies, allowing law enforcement resources to be positioned
where criminal activity is anticipated to occur.7  And algorithmic predictions
are becoming progressively arrayed across a broad swath of other legal and
social decisionmaking: to allocate public assistance,8 to preempt customs and
border violations,9 to determine immigration status,10 to forecast threats to
national security.11
Emerging proposals suggest an even greater role for algorithmically
determined legal metrics.  The confluence of massively multisourced con-
sumer surveillance and machine learning technologies has led to proposals
for algorithmically mediated “personalized law” in a variety of public and pri-
vate law areas.12  Specifically, recent scholarship has suggested that the col-
lection of detailed information on consumers, together with algorithmic
processing of such data, will allow for customized tailoring of legal impera-
REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 505, 513 (2018) (observing that “[a]lgorithmic systems have . . .
been associated with two dramatically opposed political visions”).
4 See Coglianese & Lehr, Regulating by Robot, supra note 2, at 1151; Lyria Bennett
Moses, Artificial Intelligence in the Courts, Legal Academia and Legal Practice, 91 AUSTRALIAN L.J.
561 (2017).
5 See LINA DENCIK, ARNE HINTZ, JOANNA REDDEN & HARRY WARNE, DATA JUST. LAB,
DATA SCORES AS GOVERNANCE: INVESTIGATING USES OF CITIZEN SCORING IN PUBLIC SERVICES:
PROJECT REPORT 11, 27, 55 (2018); EUBANKS, supra note 3, at 132, 140–47.
6 See State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶¶ 10–21, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754–55 (evaluating use
of an algorithm to predict criminal recidivism); Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu &
Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (discussing use of algorithms
to predict criminal recidivism).
7 See DENCIK ET AL., supra note 5, at 74; Lyria Bennett Moses & Janet Chan, Algorithmic
Prediction in Policing: Assumptions, Evaluation, and Accountability, 28 POLICING & SOC’Y 806,
813 (2018).
8 See DENCIK ET AL., supra note 5, at 48, 52; EUBANKS, supra note 3, at 76–82.
9 FAIZA PATEL, RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, SOPHIA DENUYL & RAYA KOREH, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST., SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
USES DIGITAL DATA IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 15–16 (2019).
10 Id. at 27–29.
11 Id. at 15, 20–21.
12 See generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personaliza-
tion of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333 (2019) (surveying the literature on algorithmically per-
sonalized law); Philipp Hacker, Personalizing EU Private Law: From Disclosures to Nudges and
Mandates, 25 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 651 (2017) (surveying personalized law literature under
European legal systems).
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tives to the capacity or characteristics of individual actors.13  This body of
work argues that legal directives could be matched to detailed consumer
profiles so as to create metrics that are “personalized” for the profiled indi-
vidual, rather than uniform for the general populace.14  Rather than evaluat-
ing the standard of care for a hypothetical reasonably prudent person, tort
law could perhaps algorithmically determine the standard of care for a given
accused tortfeasor.15  Rather than allocate inheritance according to default
intestacy rules, estate law could perhaps devise assets according to the
algorithmically predicted preferences of a given decedent.16  Proposals of
this sort have been circulated for a variety of other legal regimes, including
contract, criminal law, and copyright.17
Relying as they do on mechanisms of consumer surveillance, these pro-
posals are effectively intended to translate the growing provision of mass
“personalization” or “modulation” of market services and institutions to the
provision of legal services and institutions.18  Although such proposals for
personalized legal metrics carry a degree of superficial plausibility, on closer
inspection it becomes clear that they combine the worst defects of idealized
economic analysis and simplistic algorithmic utopianism.19  Such proposals
display a breathtaking degree of naiveté regarding the workings of
algorithmic classification, not merely regarding the limitations of the techni-
13 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
627, 674–75 (2016) (postulating that personalized negligence standards could be gener-
ated via predictive algorithms); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default
Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1433–35, 1442–44 (2014) (postu-
lating that personalized legal rules for wills, organ donation, and other matters could be
generated via predictive algorithms).
14 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J.
429 (2016) [hereinafter Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving Laws]; Anthony J. Casey & Anthony
Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401 (2017).
15 See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 13, at 674–75.
16 See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 13, at 1419–20.
17 See, e.g., id. at 680; Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in
Contract Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256 (2019); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Assessing the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
489, 490–91 (2019); Adi Libson & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the Personalization of Copy-
right Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 528 (2019); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 13, at 1419.
18 See Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power, in INFORMATION, FREEDOM AND PROP-
ERTY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 57, 62, 66 (Mireille
Hildebrandt & Bibi van den Berg eds., 2016) (explaining the market strategy of modulated
personalization to gain competitive advantage); Karen Yeung, Five Fears About Mass Predic-
tive Personalization in an Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 8 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 258, 259–60
(2018) (explaining the industrial movement from mass production to mass
personalization).
19 Cf. Philip Maximilian Bender, Limits on Personalization: A Normative Theory of
Default Rule Tailoring 8–9 (Apr. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(arguing that such personalized law proposals fail both normative legal and constitutional
requirements).
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cal infrastructure on which such classifications would rest,20 but regarding
the characteristics of the social infrastructure on which such classifications
depend.  An increasingly robust sociological literature demonstrates that
algorithmic scoring effectuates “classification situations” that recreate and
reinforce existing social orders, accelerating some of the most problematic
mechanisms for exploitation and inequality.21  Such metrics not only amplify
and reinforce existing social biases, but tend to produce detrimental self-
surveillance.  Due to such effects, the quantified assessments supplied by
algorithmic scoring are not neutral, but take on normative and moral
connotations.
As yet, the legal policy discussions on algorithmic decisionmaking have
taken little note of this work.  But given the growing literature demonstrating
the perverse social effects of algorithmic scoring systems, it seems clear that
the incorporation of such metrics into the determination of legal status offers
a new and troubling challenge to the rule of law.  Legal determinations such
as tort liability or criminal culpability that carry their own moral weight are
likely to produce unintended consequences when associated with morally
charged algorithmic metrics.  A close examination of these mechanisms
quickly illuminates disjunctions at the intersection among jurisprudence,
automated technologies, and socially reflexive practices, and alerts us to
areas of concern as legal institutions are increasingly amalgamated into the
growing algorithmic assemblage.
The existing legal literature has only begun to touch the most evident
issues regarding algorithmic governance.  Following the categorical frame-
work laid out by Lucas Introna, we might divide the issues of governance, and
the legal literature addressing such issues, into three groupings.22  The first
of these categories concerns governance by algorithms, that is, the effects of
deploying automated systems to administer legal and regulatory oversight.23
Related to this set of questions, we can discern another emerging literature
addressing a second set of issues around governance of algorithms, that is, the
problems and issues related to oversight of algorithms that are deployed in
both public and private sectors.24  Under the first set of questions, we want to
investigate whether automated systems used in governance are likely to pro-
mote efficiency, justice, equity, and democratic values.  Under the second set
of questions, we want to consider how to ensure that the operation of auto-
mated systems is fair, accurate, unbiased, and legally compliant.  The inquir-
20 See generally A. Feder Cooper & Karen E.C. Levy, Imperfection Is the Norm: A Com-
puter Systems Perspective on Real-Time IoT and Enforcement (Apr. 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the fundamental engineering limitations on
latency and accuracy in distributed computing).
21 See Angwin et al., supra note 6; see also infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
22 See Lucas D. Introna, Algorithms, Governance, and Governmentality: On Governing Aca-
demic Writing, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 17, 28–30 (2016).
23 Id. at 29.
24 Id. at 28–29.
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ies are clearly related, as for example, in the concern that inaccurate or
biased algorithms are unlikely to produce fair or just social outcomes.
Each of these sets of inquiries constitutes a legitimate and important line
of investigation, but neither is my primary concern in this Article.  Instead, I
focus here on a third set of issues that has gone virtually unaddressed in the
legal literature.  Borrowing a term from Foucault, we may term these to be
questions relating to the governmentality of algorithms, that is, to the mecha-
nisms by which algorithms may fundamentally alter the personal behaviors
and social structures with which they interact.25  Under the first two sets of
inquiries, previous commentators have begun to consider whether
algorithmic governance comports with the rules and expectations we have
for a civil society.  But here I hope to address the antecedent question as to
when the deployment of algorithmic systems may fundamentally change the
rules and expectations by which we live.  The question is not whether algo-
rithms can or do fall within the rules; the question is how and whether they
make the rules.
Consequently, in this Article, I begin to map out the intersection
between the social effects of quantification and the social construction of
algorithms in the context of legal decisionmaking.  In previous work, I have
explored the implications of attempting to incorporate legal standards into
algorithms, arguing that the social action typical of algorithmic systems
promises to shape and eventually become the legal standard it seeks to imple-
ment.26  Here I essentially consider the inverse proposition: I explore the
effects of incorporating algorithms, which is to say algorithmic metrics, into
legal standards.  In particular, I will examine the anticipated use of
algorithmically processed “Big Data” in attempting to align legal incentives
with social expectations.
I begin my examination by sketching the features of the sprawling and
uncoordinated data gathering apparatus, or “surveillant assemblage,” from
which the profiles for algorithmic processing are extracted.  I particularly
highlight the distortions introduced into data profiles by the processing, by
the social context, and by the inevitable interpretation associated with
algorithmic metrics.  A number of previous commentators have been prop-
erly concerned about the biases endemic to data profiling, but I argue that
algorithmic bias goes well beyond the previous discussions of prejudice or
inaccuracy to shape and define the social relationships and behavior sur-
rounding the subjects of algorithmic data profiling.
Beginning in Part II, I locate the source of such distortions in reflexive
social practices that are embodied in algorithmic measurements, and with
which algorithmic processes interact in a broader structural context.
Although there are numerous case studies documenting such effects, I
employ familiar illustrations drawn from the intensively studied examples of
commensurate credit scoring and law school ranking.  The reflexive effects
25 Id. at 30.
26 See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 285 (2019).
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found in such algorithmic processes are well known in the existing social
science literature, but are now accelerated and amplified by the speed and
scale of automated data analysis and processing.  In Part III, I argue that due
to such processes, algorithmic metrics are performative, in the sense that
they create and instantiate the numerical models on which they are based.
In other words, algorithms create their own social facts.  These effects are
particularly acute where algorithms instantiate economic constructs, where
they can be seen to reconfigure the participants and the practices in modern
commercial exchanges.  I show that such effects are, perhaps paradoxically,
heightened by transparency of algorithmic inputs and processes, leaving in
doubt the advisability of some recent scholarly calls for greater transparency
in algorithmic profiling.
Finally, in the last two Parts of the Article, I link these concepts to the
normative functions of law, showing how legal judgments will be distorted by
the introduction of algorithmic scoring regimes, particularly those being
imported from datafied business models in the private sector.  I describe how
the social processes on which algorithmic metrics rest lead ultimately to the
characterization of such metrics as moral character judgments.  When
inserted into legal determinations that intrinsically require moral character
judgments, we may expect the value biases embedded in algorithmic legal
metrics to effectively become legal judgments.  The precipitation of
algorithmic metrics into legal culpability poses a particular problem for
American legal discourse, due to the American legal system’s decades-long
fascination with the economic analysis of law.
In tracing the characteristic arc of algorithmic metrics from profiling
through legal application, this Article makes several novel contributions to
the literature on law and algorithmic governance.  First, it details corrosive
social effects of algorithmic legal metrics that extend far beyond the con-
cerns about accuracy that have thus far dominated critiques of such metrics.
Second, it demonstrates that deploying traditional corrective governance
mechanisms such as enhanced due process or transparency is wholly inade-
quate to remedy such corrosive effects, and indeed that some such remedies,
such as transparency, may actually serve to exacerbate the worst effects of
algorithmic governmentality.  Third, the Article shows that the application of
algorithmic metrics to legal decisions aggravates the latent tension between
equity and autonomy that is endemic in liberal institutions, undermining
democratic values in a manner and on a scale not previously experienced by
human societies.  I therefore close with some thoughts regarding restriction
of algorithmic quantification in legal settings, and the need to identify the
areas most perniciously affected by such systems, so as to exclude or curtail
automated decisionmaking from such decisions.
I. SURVEILLANCE AND PROFILING
In one sense, algorithmic regulatory practice has deep historical roots,
and so might be thought simply to constitute an extension of well-known
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governance practices embedded in the modern bureaucratic state.27  Begin-
ning with the development of nineteenth-century bureaucratic governance,
statistical methods have been increasingly used to assess and manage popula-
tions, defining the existence of persons according to actuarial criteria.28
Nineteenth-century data was gathered with some statistical notion as to their
purpose—assessing the incidence of crime, or of disease, or of financial
transactions.29  More modern data accumulation and processing practices
continue to gather all these statistical records and more, but they are repur-
posed toward the management of populations through statistical and demo-
graphic categorization that Foucault termed “biopower.”30  Thus, current
practices mark a shift from quantification of social statistics in order to
describe and predict relationships to quantification of social relationships in
order to monitor and control them.31
This shift in the purpose of social quantification has been dramatically
advanced by the technical capabilities of recordkeeping media and methods.
Once either public or private entities began amassing records, it was not long
before the accumulated data contained in paper records could be recom-
bined for new purposes not anticipated in their compilation.32  Such recom-
bination might occur within an organization, then between organizations,
and then between organizations with very different goals and provenance,
such as public governmental and private corporate institutions.33  The rate
and frequency of recombination is largely a function of the medium, which
with physical written records is relatively slow and intermittent.  But the
potential for recombination becomes exponentially greater with the speed
27 See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCI-
ENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 7–8 (1995) (discussing the reliance of unelected bureaucrats on
ostensibly objective numerical criteria in order to gain decisional legitimacy); see also
Luciana Parisi, Critical Computation: Digital Automata and General Artificial Thinking, 36 THE-
ORY CULTURE & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2019, at 89, 92 (discussing the relation of modern machine
learning techniques to the history of statistical pattern recognition).
28 See Ian Hacking, Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers, 5 HUMANS. SOC’Y 279
(1982); Ian Hacking, Making Up People, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY,
INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 222, 223 (Thomas C. Heller, Morton
Sosna & David E. Wellbery eds., 1986) [hereinafter Hacking, Making Up People]; Peter
Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 12 (1990).
29 See LORRAINE DASTON, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT, at xii (1988);
IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 3 (1990).
30 MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE
FRANCE, 1975–76, at 243, 250, 254 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey
trans., 2003).
31 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 183–84 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977); see also Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 434 (noting that modern
machine learning is reliant on the extension of methods developed in the nineteenth
century).
32 Stanton Wheeler, Problems and Issues in Record-Keeping, in ON RECORD: FILES AND DOS-
SIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE 3, 5 (Stanton Wheeler ed., 1969).
33 Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRITISH J.
SOCIOLOGY 605, 610–11 (2000).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 9 18-JAN-21 11:28
2021] algorithmic  legal  metrics 1155
and enormous storage capacity of digitized records.  As data recombination
becomes easier, it becomes almost an end in itself, with justifications gener-
ated after the collection, dissemination, combination and correlation has
already occurred.
The literature on the implications of such electronic data profiling is
enormous, and a full exploration lies well beyond the scope of my discussion
in this Article.34  Here I wish to highlight only a few salient points that are
important to the present investigation.  First, algorithmic profiling from
recombinant data records relies upon the increasingly intensified forms of
technological observation operated by both state and private entities.35  Indi-
vidual behavior is profiled from combinations of police records, court dock-
ets, insurance profiles, shopping behavior, credit scoring, geolocation
patterns, vehicle and land title registrations, vital statistics, electronic commu-
nications, browsing habits, search queries, and multiple other routine social
transaction records.36  In some cases data is combed from the digitized
records of physical transactions; in other cases it is extracted from the stored
digital traces of purely electronic occurrences.  Digital formats make records
of each type easier to combine with records of similar origin, or of different
origins.
Second, the concept of comprehensive, “panoptic” surveillance has
become the standard trope in discussing the burgeoning incidence of data
accumulation, storage, and analysis.37  The reference has its origin in Ben-
tham’s famous concept of the “panopticon,” envisioned as a surveillance sys-
tem for prisons, intended to impose behavioral conformity among prisoners
by the effect of observational uncertainty: because the prisoners might be
surreptitiously observed at any time, they would behave as if they were
observed at all times.38  This form of self-monitoring was later recognized by
Foucault as a type of institutional power to impose order by means of inter-
nalized discipline—not only prisoners, but citizens in the general population
could be induced to change their own behavior in response to surveillance.39
In essence, Bentham’s original, particular penal setting for panoptic control
has become inconsequential, as a population under continuous surveillance
becomes prisoner of its own responses.
34 For a few major guideposts, see, for example, JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 4 (2012); HELEN NISSEN-
BAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 6
(2010); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMA-
TION AGE 2 (2004).
35 See Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 33, at 610.
36 Id. at 613, 616–18.
37 See, e.g., Jerome E. Dobson & Peter F. Fisher, The Panopticon’s Changing Geography, 97
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 307, 309 (2007); Joshua Fairfield, Escape into the Panopticon: Virtual
Worlds and the Surveillance Society, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 131, 131–32 (2009); Elizabeth
Stoycheff, Juan Liu, Kai Xu & Kunto Wibowo, Privacy and the Panopticon: Online Mass Sur-
veillance’s Deterrence and Chilling Effects, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 602, 604 (2019).
38 See Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 33, at 607.
39 See FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 195–97.
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Third, these disciplinary effects are enormously multiplied by the availa-
bility of automated data processing.  As the speed and capacity of computa-
tional processing is added to surveillance practices, the general populace is
increasingly the subject of the widespread, computer-enabled collection,
searching, and screening of digital records that Gandy famously dubbed the
“panoptic sort.”40  Surveillance, sorting, and processing capabilities reinforce
and feed on one another.  The torrent of available data can only be
processed by superhuman, automated means, and in turn the availability of
such automated systems invites the continued collection of surveillant data.
Fourth, the vast quantities of accumulating surveillant data are no longer
necessarily sorted according to criteria contemplated by human controllers,
but rather according to criteria detected and determined by machines.
These systems are not “artificially intelligent” in any robust meaning of that
term.41  Because of intractable problems in directly coding judgment and
reasoning processes, attention in AI design has increasingly turned to
machine learning systems, by which statistical algorithms discern patterns in
massive datasets, and optimize their functions according to those patterns.42
When used for predictive analytics, such systems identify category characteris-
tics in order to similarly classify future data with congruent characteristics.43
But rather than having a programmer specify a categorical model, the
machine develops its own model via progressive rounds of rapid trial and
error.44  One result of such endogenous machine categorization is that the
criteria for the outcome often remain unexplained, and are often indeci-
pherable to human explication.45
Fifth, the vast and growing apparatus of surveillance is the result of the
natural combination and intersection of ostensibly independent electronic
monitoring and recordkeeping.46  Independently created systems are joined
and connected out of convenience, efficiency, or necessity.  Concatenated
monitoring and recordkeeping apparatus arise from the intersection of
40 See OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION 15 (1993).
41 See M.C. Elish & danah boyd, Situating Methods in the Magic of Big Data and AI, 85
COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 57, 61–63 (2018) (describing the current emphasis on machine
learning over “good old fashioned” artificial intelligence (quoting JOHN HAUGELAND, ARTI-
FICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE VERY IDEA 112 (1985))); see also Marion Fourcade & Kieran
Healy, Seeing Like a Market, 15 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 9, 24 (2017) (observing that AI research
abandoned the idea of machines that can think in favor of machines that can learn).
42 Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Categories All the Way Down, 42 HIST. SOC. RSCH.
286, 292–93 (2017).
43 See Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 433; see also Geoffrey C. Bowker, The Theory/Data
Thing, 8 INT’L J. COMMUNICATION 1795, 1796–97 (2014) (observing that even though cate-
gories are not specified, “Big Data” correlation inevitably implicates categorization).
44 Parisi, supra note 27, at 100.
45 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 42, at 293; see also Anupam Chander, The Racist
Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1040 (2017) (reviewing PASQUALE, supra note 3) (“[I]n
the era of self-enhancing algorithms, the algorithm’s human designers may not fully
understand their own creation . . . .”).
46 Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 33, at 610–11.
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diverse systems, each converging into the next, lacking discernable bounda-
ries.  Thus, no single technology or social system constitutes the origin or
genesis of panoptic surveillance.47  And by the same token, the growing con-
cern over privacy and surveillance cannot be easily answered or resolved by
curtailing or modulating a given practice, because privacy erosion cannot be
attributed to any one source.48
Instead, a proliferating conglomeration of previously discrete and sepa-
rate surveillance systems functions as what has been termed in total the “sur-
veillant assemblage.”49  The assemblage designation recognizes that beneath
the seemingly stable exterior of any entity lies a complex tangle of multiple
phenomena and processes working in concert.  An assemblage thus consti-
tutes a conglomeration of myriad interconnected tangible and intangible
components that function together despite their heterogeneous origins.50
With the addition of AI analysis and processing for surveillance data from
disparate sources, the resulting sociotechnical sprawl might be designated
the “algorithmic assemblage,” and our goal here is to discern the circum-
stances of legal status assigned within its ambit.51
A. Big Data Processing
A key consideration in the deployment of algorithmic legal metrics must
be the assumptions built into their operation.  As this Section discusses in
detail, the machine learning systems on which such metrics are based are by
no means neutral, omniscient, or infallible.  They are to the contrary highly
selective, incomplete, and deeply value laden.  Their technical design models
the world under assumptions that may be profoundly at odds with their use
in legal determinations.
Unfortunately, some commentators observing the increasing availability
of massive datasets have mistakenly supposed that algorithmic analysis of
such copious information offers exhaustive or comprehensive results.52  This
47 Id. at 610.
48 Id. at 609.
49 Id. at 606.
50 MANUEL DELANDA, A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY: ASSEMBLAGE THEORY AND SOCIAL
COMPLEXITY 10–12 (2006); GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS: CAP-
ITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 71, 88–91 (Brian Massumi trans., 1987).
51 Cf. N. KATHERINE HAYLES, UNTHOUGHT: THE POWER OF THE COGNITIVE NONCON-
SCIOUS 118 (2017) (describing as a “cognitive assemblage” the “arrangement of systems,
subsystems, and individual actors through which information flows” between human and
algorithmic actors).
52 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 33–34; see also Casey &
Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, supra note 14, at 437 (asserting that “[t]he biases and inconsis-
tencies found in individual judgments can largely be washed away using advanced data
analytics”). Contra Carl Lagoze, Big Data, Data Integrity, and the Fracturing of the Control Zone,
BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2014, at 1, 5 (critiquing the claim by Mayer-Schönberger and
Cukier that massive datasets offer statistically complete and faultless outputs); S. Leonelli,
What Difference Does Quantity Make?  On the Epistemology of Big Data in Biology, BIG DATA &
SOC’Y, Apr.–June 2014, at 1, 2 (same).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 12 18-JAN-21 11:28
1158 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
is a fundamental misconception.  Data analysis is necessarily selective, not
promiscuous.  Certainly, it is true that the evolving surveillant assemblage
feeds on a wide variety of inputs: text, video, audio, statistical, transactional,
positional, and other information varieties.53  But each of these diverse
sources entails its own particular structural and content formats.  The use of
such disparate data sources in profiling requires the imposition of some com-
mon configuration on differently structured or unstructured digital data.
And imposition of a common standard on heterologous datasets inevitably
results in reconfiguration of the data, and discarding of a good deal of
information.
Thus, as Amoore and Piotukh observe, analytic inputs are not collected;
the input process is rather properly designated as ingestion, with all the bio-
logical implications of mastication, decomposition, and metabolism that the
term entails.54  Because data are drawn from a wide variety of sources in
numerous formats, analysis of the resulting numerical mélange is possible
only by extraction and reformatting of the digital patchwork.  Algorithmic
data processing employs the spatial logics of the mathematical and physical
sciences to reduce a wide range of inputs to homogenous numerical inputs.55
The conversion of files to standardized, compatible formats reduces differ-
ences in kind to differences in degree.56
Data collection and preparation thus require the linkage of data ele-
ments by means of joins across the intersections and correlations from differ-
ent datasets.  Such linkage and compilation necessarily strip away much of
the unique formatting and context of the original source.  To reconfigure
otherwise incompatible data, analytical processing imposes a radical decon-
textualization on the data, paring away extraneous information and mean-
ings.57  Contextual, indexical, symbolic, or experiential differences deemed
inessential to the data are subsumed in processing.58  For example, in text
files, words and punctuation that are considered superfluous to the analytical
purpose are removed; so too in other types of files, ostensibly irrelevant pix-
els and bits are distilled off.  This process results in a flattening of the ulti-
mate dataset that is indifferent to the qualitative differences contained in the
initial data.59
53 See Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 433.
54 Louise Amoore & Volha Piotukh, Life Beyond Big Data: Governing with Little Analytics,
44 ECON. & SOC’Y 341, 345 (2015).
55 See LUCIANA PARISI, CONTAGIOUS ARCHITECTURE: COMPUTATION, AESTHETICS, AND
SPACE 3, 8–9 (2013).
56 Amoore & Piotukh, supra note 54, at 361.
57 Antoinette Rouvroy, Technology, Virtuality and Utopia: Governmentality in an Age of
Autonomic Computing, in LAW, HUMAN AGENCY AND AUTONOMIC COMPUTING: THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 119, 126 (Mireille Hildebrandt &
Antoinette Rouvroy eds., 2011) (explaining that algorithmic correlation of captured data is
indifferent to the causes of phenomena detected).
58 Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 434.
59 Amoore & Piotukh, supra note 54, at 348–49.
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Additionally, as Andrew Iliadis relates, formalized ontologies are often
employed to integrate separate datasets, by providing a common categorical
rubric for data that is drawn from heterologous formatting and classification
schemes.  Imposition of a common ontology homologizes the data for com-
parison and analysis.  But by imposing common classification on differing
informational formats, new factors are introduced into the resulting dataset.
Ontological templates entail their own implicit biases and assumptions, over-
riding the original dataset with standardized epistemic imperatives.60
Ingested files are partitioned and sorted, first broken down into manage-
able pieces, and then reassembled according to summary inputs drawn from
the fragments.  A common technique is to shard data files, arbitrarily break-
ing them up according to size boundaries that do not correspond to their
initial structure, then distributing the shards across multiple processors for
analysis.61  Analysis proceeds according to inductively generated queries that
look for strong correlations that emerge from the data.62  Typically, predic-
tive systems assume that there is an underlying pattern in the data that can be
described by a mathematical function; the system then begins to generate
and test functions to fit the data inputs, seeking useful approximations of the
function that is assumed to be there.63  The algorithm generates different
search criteria, selects among them according to relational strength, and
makes some determination as to which results are thought to be sufficiently
robust or interesting to be elevated as search criteria.64
This iterative process has been dubbed “the automation of automation”
because the system generates its own search criteria.65  Rather than predeter-
mined search criteria that are designated via formal symbolic representation
of ideas or explicit equations, the analytical algorithms generate iterative
search rules and retain those that have the strongest levels of relational sup-
port or confidence.66  It is in some sense “the inverse of programming”: the
system is not engaged to derive output from a given algorithm, but rather to
derive the algorithm that produces a given output.67  Not all patterns are
identified or measured, neither are all patterns preserved for analysis.
Rather, the system reduces choices by selecting the most plausible data
correlations.68
60 Andrew Iliadis, Algorithms, Ontology, and Social Progress, 14 GLOB. MEDIA & COMMC’N
219, 223 (2018).
61 Ilias Tachmazidis, Grigoris Antoniou, Giorgos Flouris & Spyros Kotoulas, Scalable
Nonmonotonic Reasoning over RDF Data Using MapReduce, in JOINT WORKSHOP ON SCALABLE
AND HIGH-PERFORMANCE SEMANTIC WEB SYSTEMS 75, 77 (2012).
62 FRANK OHLHORST, BIG DATA ANALYTICS: TURNING BIG DATA INTO BIG MONEY 8
(2013).
63 Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 435.
64 See Amoore & Piotukh, supra note 54, at 353–54; Elish & boyd, supra note 41, at
70–71.
65 Parisi, supra note 27, at 90.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 92.
68 Id.
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Thus, algorithmic pattern detection and scoring outputs are not found,
they are actually constructed by the processes of data harvesting, ingestion, and
analysis.  The process of machine learning develops and connects recurrent
data features to indeterminate external factors.69  This occurs not as a search
to discover or identify information of interest; rather, the object of interest is
essentially created by the process of analysis.  The analytical process detaches
the object of interest from the population screened.  Statistical identification
of relationships determines which patterns in the partitioned and reassem-
bled data become perceptible.70  The result is to focus attention on whatever
the algorithm determines to be an item of interest, while discarding and
negating the context from which the object of interest is drawn.71
When applied to the data associated with individuals, this process in
effect creates identities.72  Far from representing or capturing any given indi-
vidual, the action of algorithmic processing results in the generation of
abstracted and decorporealized “data doubles” that figure or signify individ-
ual actions.73  This representational digital doppelganger is entirely epiphe-
nomenal, capturing only the record of manifest personal activities.74  The
construct in some sense constitutes a virtual profile,75 decontextualized and
extracted from an amalgam of processed data.76  It is neither accurate nor
inaccurate with regard to any corresponding natural person.77  It is rather an
ex post emblem of assignment of the related natural person to an algorithmi-
cally determined category.78
For any given data double, the algorithmically created category assigned
to it—for credit worthiness, security risk, willingness to pay, or other personal
characteristic—may possibly correspond to what is meant by the same term
outside of a numerical correlation.  But machine learning is based upon cor-
69 Id. at 99.
70 Amoore & Piotukh, supra note 54, at 360.
71 Id.
72 John Cheney-Lippold, A New Algorithmic Identity: Soft Biopolitics and the Modulation of
Control, THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, Nov. 2011, at 164, 165.
73 Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 173–74 (Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J.
Boczkowski & Kirsten A. Foot eds., 2014); Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 33, at 611, 612.
74 Gillespie, supra note 73, at 174.
75 MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF INFORMATION: POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND SOCIAL CON-
TEXT 97 (1990).
76 David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in SURVEIL-
LANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 13, 22 (David Lyon
ed., 2003); Yeung, supra note 3, at 515.
77 Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 33, at 614; see also Celia Lury & Sophie Day,
Algorithmic Personalization as a Mode of Individuation, THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, Mar. 2019,
at 17, 24 (explaining that predictive algorithms construct iterative approximations rather
than establish relations of absolute equivalence).
78 See Lury & Day, supra note 77, at 20.
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relative patterns, and indifferent to the causes of such correlation.79
Whatever the corresponding categories may mean in physical society,
algorithmic processing configures them as mathematical vectors, associating
certain data patterns with the statistical doubles generated in the wake of
individual behaviors.  In this sense, algorithmic categorization defines rather
than discovers the parameters of a given population, how that population is
discursively situated and perceived, and hence what opportunities or life
chances that population will encounter.80
B. Algorithmic Biases
It should be clear from the exposition thus far that data analytics are
technologies that entail a particular type of perception; just as the natural
human organs of perception such as the eye or ear are selectively attuned to
particular information, screening out some inputs and reformatting others
for comprehension, so the algorithms that make data manageable reduce
and reassemble heterogeneous inputs to numerical homogeneity for quanti-
tative processing.81  In doing so, these analytic processes alter the value and
meaning of the data inputs they quantify, and recursively impose those values
and meaning on the social processes that rely upon them.82
These characteristics of data analytics raise the issue of bias in
algorithmic metrics.  Because the operations and output of algorithmic
processing are expressed quantitively, there is a temptation to think of them
as objectively free from biases.83  This is a common foible with any numerical
operation and representation; bare numbers always seem to be free from ide-
ological taint.  Moreover, because pattern assessment and targeting are ceded
to the algorithm, the process offers additional appearances of neutrality.
Because there is no proximate human animus in the determination or execu-
tion of the algorithm’s determination, the data inputs seem cognitively
remote from the level of human fallibility—what Donna Haraway famously
referred to as “the god trick.”84  Scored data thus impart an illusion of objec-
tivity because they are rendered by machines, and their human initiators
appear distantly removed from the ultimate output.85
But far from offering an objective measurement, any system of quantita-
tive accounting necessarily entails its own particular social and political con-
79 See Rouvroy, supra note 57, at 126; see also Bowker, supra note 43, at 1795 (observing
that algorithmic data methods essentially bypass the maxim that correlation is not
causation).
80 Cheney-Lippold, supra note 72, at 175.
81 Amoore & Piotukh, supra note 54, at 344.
82 Id.
83 See Rouvroy, supra note 57, at 127; see also PASQUALE, supra note 3, at 15 (observing
that algorithmic systems give decisions a “patina of inevitability”).
84 Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege
of Partial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575, 581 (1988).
85 See Cheney-Lippold, supra note 72, at 167; Fourcade & Healy, supra note 42, at 292.
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text.86  Numerical transformations are always value-laden, are never
deterministic in any objective sense, and always depend upon human judg-
ment.87  Even among the measurements made in “objective” or “natural” sci-
ences, there are no neutral facts, only judgments.88  Every scientific
measurement is based upon a human decision that some things that will be
included in the measurement matter, and other things that will be ignored
or excluded from the measurement do not matter.89  At the very least, some
human decision about data suitability must be made.  Neither do algorithmic
scores provide windows on naturally occurring, immanent, or objective phe-
nomena.  They are rather the very human products of intricate, convoluted,
and contrived interpretation.90  Even slight or unnoticed changes in the cri-
teria for measurement, or on the mix of inputs relied upon for assessment,
may substantially change the outcome.91
The intervention of human judgment can be readily seen from the
description above of predictive data processing.  Machine learning does not
operate by means of inductive logic, deriving general rules from specific
instances, nor by means of deductive logic, deriving from application of gen-
eral rules.92  It rather operates by means of a process closest to abductive
logic, that is the generation and testing of hypotheses.93  Via iterative correla-
tive pattern matching, machine learning systems abductively infer facts, rules,
and hypotheses to speculatively explain unknown phenomena.94  Such spec-
ulative inference requires selection and culling of the multiple relational
rules generated by the system.95  From all the myriad possible correlations
detected within the data, the system preserves “best” or most “interesting”
correlations to elevate to operational models.96  This of course requires some
notion of what constitutes best or most interesting, and that notion is not
supplied by the machine—it has to be supplied by the machine’s engi-
neers.97  Human judgment is required to adjust the output against both
86 David J. Cooper & Michael J. Sherer, The Value of Corporate Accounting Reports: Argu-
ments for a Political Economy of Accounting, 9 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 207, 208 (1984).
87 Thus, the “facially neutral algorithm” that Professor Chander postulates in his analy-
sis of data biases is not merely a contradiction, but an impossibility. See Chander, supra
note 45, at 1036 (critiquing potentially disparate impact of “facially neutral algorithms”).
88 J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 88–91 (Harper & Row rev. ed. 1965); see
also PORTER, supra note 27, at 7 (arguing that scientific objectivity is a cultural construct).
89 See J. BRONOWSKI, A SENSE OF THE FUTURE: ESSAYS IN NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 6, 11
(Piero E. Ariotti ed., 1977).
90 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1260–63
(2008).
91 Fourcade & Healy supra note 42, at 289.
92 Parisi, supra note 27, at 92.
93 See Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF SCIENCE 184, 184 (W.H. Newton-Smith ed., 2000) (explaining hypothesis generation
via abductive reasoning).
94 Parisi, supra note 27, at 108.
95 Id. at 109–10.
96 See id. at 110.
97 See Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 438.
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overfitting and underfitting, deciding whether the fit between the model and
the data is too tight so as to miss relevant correlations or too loose so as to
produce spurious correlations.98
Machine learning is thus an iterative process requiring continual human
intervention to revise, adjust, and optimize the learning process.99  Such
“artificial intelligence” is effectively a prosthetic extension of human judg-
ment, entailing all the messy and imprecise selectivity that human judgment
entails.  The impact of such systematically selective or incomplete algorithmic
inputs is well known from a variety of past studies.  One extensively studied
instance is found in the example of American credit scoring practices.  This
is among the best characterized and examined algorithmic profiling sys-
tems.100  In this system, records of various personal activities, such as mort-
gage payments, credit inquiries, available unsecured credit lines, and length
of credit history are quantified and agglomerated in a proprietary
formula.101  The best known and most widely used algorithmic credit metric
is the “FICO” score produced from consumer records by the Fair Isaac
Corporation.102
Careful examination of credit scoring practices repeatedly demonstrates
that the most vulnerable and impoverished sectors of society are often those
least able to avoid harmful surveillance and value extraction, but who remain
invisible to advantageous classification and scoring systems.103  It is well
known that the criteria chosen for calculating the credit score render certain
financial activities algorithmically visible and others invisible.  Specifically,
lower income individuals are systematically underrepresented or misrepre-
sented in credit scoring because their activities are often absent from the
records drawn from conventional banking, mortgage loan, credit reporting,
and other financial transactions lying outside their means.104  Other infor-
mation that might be relevant to financial stability and lending risk is typi-
98 See TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STA-
TISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION 38 (2d ed. 2009)
99 See Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine Learning, COMMN’CS.
ACM, Oct. 2012, at 78, 84.
100 See, e.g., Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Classification Situations: Life-Chances in the
Neoliberal Era, 38 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 559 (2013); Mark Kear, Playing the Credit Score Game:
Algorithms, ‘Positive’ Data and the Personification of Financial Objects, 46 ECON. & SOC’Y 346
(2017); Donncha Marron, ‘Lending by Numbers’: Credit Scoring and the Constitution of Risk
Within American Consumer Credit, 36 ECON. & SOC’Y 103 (2007); Martha Poon, Scorecards as
Devices for Consumer Credit: The Case of Fair, Isaac & Company Incorporated, 55 SOCIO. REV. 284
(2007); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (summarizing the history and impact of
consumer credit scoring).
101 Marron, supra note 100, at 111, 115; Poon, supra note 100, at 294–95.
102 See Poon, supra note 100, at 285.
103 See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57 (2013);
Kaveh Waddell, How Big Data Harms Poor Communities, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2016), https:/
/www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-big-data-harms-poor-communi-
ties/477423/.
104 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 565.
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cally filtered out or ignored.  Financial activity common to lower income
populations, such as rental payments or payday loans, is excluded from the
ambit of the system.105
Credit scoring is representative of the reproduction of social context
within algorithmic metrics.  Underprivileged segments of the population
generate data profiles disproportionately drawn from interactions with public
assistance, law enforcement, and penal institutions.  At the same time, data
on more affluent populations is drawn from a different set of recording sys-
tems, yielding not only markedly different types of data records, but records
that are turned to purposes that reinforce their own privilege.106  Favored
metrics are valorized, and disfavored metrics become invisible.107  As a result
of such algorithmic flattening, credit scoring, which was originally intended
to help neutralize bias in lending, serves to enforce class divisions by recapit-
ulating the circumstances of the profiled data subjects.
Further, to the extent that lower income is equated with race, differen-
tial scoring of impoverished communities effectively means that racial minor-
ities are systematically underrepresented or misrepresented in the scoring
system.108  Some attempts to establish or “repair” credit have focused inte-
grating marginalized “risky” populations into the FICO system by instructing
them on the activities and that would be favorably recognized by the credit
scoring algorithm.109  Other attempts have focused on integrating into credit
scoring the data from social systems and institutions, such as payday loans
lenders, that might be characteristic of otherwise invisible populations.110
But whether fully invisible or partially invisible, minority populations remain
algorithmically differentiated from affluent populations by virtue of data per-
ception, escaping notice because of the selective inclusion or exclusion of
data within algorithmic metrics.
A distinct but related form of systemic bias stems from decontextualized
reporting that does not necessarily reflect the circumstances of the individual
tied to the data profile.  For example, algorithmic credit scoring incorporates
and heavily weights evidence of failure to make credit payments on time.111
Even assuming the record of late payments is “accurate” rather than mis-
taken, in the sense of reflecting an actual occurrence, the data typically leaves
little room for context or explanation.  Late payments may be the result of a
wide range of contextual factors, from misdirected postal mail to natural
disasters.  In some cases, the failure of timely payments may be due to the
intrinsic characteristics or behaviors of the individual, such as forgetfulness,
profligacy, or poor funds management.  In other cases, the cause may be
purely external and outside the individual’s control, such as the loss of
105 Kear, supra note 100, at 360; Marron, supra note 100, at 125.
106 Kear, supra note 100, at 360.
107 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 565.
108 PASQUALE, supra note 3, at 41.
109 Kear, supra note 100, at 360.
110 Cf. id. at 361.
111 Kear, supra note 100, at 365 n.3.
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employment, unexpected illness or injury, or identity theft.  But all of these
circumstances are acontextually reported and weighted similarly.
Consequently there is only an unclear or tenuous factual linkage
between the living individual to whom a credit score is attached and that
individual’s algorithmically constructed “credit double” intended to
represent the credit worthiness of the profiled data subject.  Any linkage is
correlative and categorical.  Some instances of reported late payment may
reflect systemic, underlying risks of extending the credit to a given individual;
others reflect serendipitous or unique occurrences that indicate little about
the individual’s behavioral propensities.  The ability of the individual to “cor-
rect” her credit record in the sense of adding context is extremely limited;
the system makes little allowance for contextual nuance.  To the extent that
there is any consumer recourse to address atypical or nonrepresentative pay-
ment situations, it typically lies in convincing a lender not to report a late or
missed payment, rather than any ability to add context to the report once it
has entered the scoring system.
Thus, the operation of the credit scoring system offers a detailed illustra-
tion of the social impact attending the algorithmic processes now being
advanced via the proliferation of machine learning systems.  Identities that
are incorporated within a given population become tethered to the catego-
ries as defined by the algorithm.112  Individual identity thus increasingly
depends upon algorithmic mediation of the relationship between surveil-
lance data and categorical meaning of that data.113  Algorithmic prediction
depends on classification, and classification depends on the existence of
identifiable class attributes.114  The process of algorithmically identifying cat-
egories, such as gender, class, or preference increasingly serves to define the
characteristics of gender, class, or preference.115  Such actuarial technologies
categorize individuals according to statistical distributions.116  Categories are
assigned on the assumption that profiles sharing characteristics derived from
past correlations will share relevant characteristics in the future.117
Consequently, although algorithmic data profiling practices may be
advanced as vehicles for “personalization,” it should be clear that they are in
fact anything but personalized.  To the contrary, as described above,
algorithmic processing flattens and distorts the depiction of the individual by
the construction of data doubles that are reduced to portable numerical rep-
resentations.118  Those profiles are then slotted into predictive categories
that are matched to selected correlative patterns.  Neither the profile nor the
category reflects more than the particular pattern that the algorithm deter-
112 Cheney-Lippold, supra note 72, at 176.
113 Id. at 178.
114 Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 433; Yeung, supra note 3, at 512.
115 Cheney-Lippold, supra note 72, at 165.
116 Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771,
772 (1988).
117 Lury & Day, supra note 77, at 23.
118 See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text.
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mines to be of interest.  As Jonathan Simon puts it, such actuarial practices
do not make people up, they “unmake them,” offering a quantified substitute
for intersubjectivity, identity, or self-awareness.119
Far from offering more personalized law, the data-driven metrics
espoused by recent commentators may be seen as offering radically deperson-
alized law, at least in the sense of respecting the individual as a person.120
Such practices might be said to produce more granular121 or atomized legal
metrics.122  But particularized legal functionality is a far cry from personaliza-
tion in any humanistic sense.123  The numerical cartoons to whom such met-
rics are applied are artificially constructed caricatures intended for
numerical manipulation rather than for individualized respect.124
II. ALGORITHMIC REFLEXIVITY
I have to this point described how data analytics winnows and reduces
the otherwise incomprehensible and unmanageable reams of data that can
be gathered and stored from surveillant sources.125  I have additionally
described how the process of data intake, treatment, and categorization teth-
ers opportunities and future behaviors to the digested vestiges of previous
behaviors.126  These information processes reflect more general social
processes that are routinely engaged in quantifying and managing informa-
tion.  In particular, algorithmic informational processing can be tied to well-
studied reflexive social processes such as commensuration.127  A close review
of such processes is foundational to understanding the social impact of algo-
rithms generally, and the implications of algorithmic legal metrics in
particular.
Commensuration, whether automated or not, occurs in the transforma-
tion of perceived qualities into quantities, creating a shared metric among the
119 Simon, supra note 116, at 792; cf. Hacking, Making Up People, supra note 28, at 223
(discussing the deconstruction of individual identities via statistical governance).
120 See Rouvroy, supra note 57, at 128 (observing that ostensibly personalized
algorithmic profiling generates categorical sorting rather than recognizing the “unique
complexity” of any human being).
121 See. e.g., Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in
Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309, 314 (2019) (referring to per-
sonalized legal rules as “granularized”).
122 See id. at 329 (referring to personalized disclosure rules as “atomiz[ed]”).
123 See Lury & Day, supra note 77, at 19 (noting the gap between algorithmic personal-
ization and individuation).
124 See Ian Hacking, How Should We Do the History of Statistics?, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT:
STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 181, 193 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller
eds., 1991).
125 N. KATHERINE HAYLES, HOW WE THINK: DIGITAL MEDIA AND CONTEMPORARY
TECHNOGENESIS 230 (2012).
126 Cheney-Lippold, supra note 72, at 169.
127 See Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell L. Stevens, Commensuration as a Social Process,
24 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 313 (1998).
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objects of the transformation.128  In doing so, this common social process
simplifies information, decontextualizes information, recategorizes informa-
tion, and ultimately alters social perceptions by directing attention away from
certain relations and toward others.129  This in turn alters institutional and
individual behaviors toward the objects of commensuration.  Rather than
directly changing behavior, commensuration alters cognition, shifting atten-
tion to favored information and away from disfavored information.130
Commensurate perceptions are produced by means of a suite of closely
entangled operations.  First, commensuration simplifies information by
reducing the characteristics of measured entities to quantified representa-
tions.131  Difference in kind is represented as a difference in degree or mag-
nitude.132  Some information is discarded and other information is valorized
in this process of quantification.133  Complex concepts become a single num-
ber or metric that is easier to remember, easier to compare, easier to discuss
and deploy in new circumstances.  Commensuration thus immediately
changes perceptions of information, emphasizing measured, quantifiable
relationships while suppressing and eclipsing others.134
Second, commensuration categorizes and restructures information.
Quantified metrics are grouped together and related to one another.  By
means of metric categorization, commensurate representations create the
perception of commonality, while eliminating from consideration other dif-
ferences or similarities.135  Thus, additional information deemed extraneous
or irrelevant is discarded as commensurate concepts are connected.  By
decontextualizing and excluding certain information so as to simplify the
remaining information to a shared metric, the commensuration process
makes accessing and processing information easier.136  This also makes the
final result appear more authoritative, by obscuring and removing the com-
plicated assumptions, discretion, and arbitrariness that infuse any informa-
tion output.137
Once broken down, this process can be readily seen in numerous well-
documented examples, such as the previously described example of credit
scoring.  We have already seen how credit scoring assembles disparate,
decontextualized measurements—payment histories, income, number of
credit accounts, type of credit accounts, and so on—and reduces these to
numbers that represent differences in degree among the various metrics.
Some data is discarded, some ignored, some distinguished.  Favored data is
128 Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Mea-
sures Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. SOCIO. 1, 16 (2007).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Espeland & Stevens, supra note 127, at 316.
132 Id. at 316–17.
133 Id. at 317.
134 Espeland & Sauder, supra note 128, at 16.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 17.
137 See generally JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958).
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combined into a final commensurate score.  Rather than a messy history of
financial transactions, a single pristine metric appears, simplified and porta-
ble, and elevated to a position of control over the subject’s opportunities or
“life chances.”
And, as described above, such commensurate metrics are reinforced by
their own selectivity.  In response to credit scoring practices, consumers who
are sufficiently affluent to engage in favored transactions are shunted toward
the institutions and practices that will generate records of such activity.
Indeed, a variety of commercial and nonprofit institutions have grown up,
offering guidance regarding the complexities of credit scoring commensura-
tion.138  Such organizations will assist consumers in building a favorable
credit history, or will advise consumers on activities that will convert an unfa-
vorable score to one that is more favorable.139  In many instances, the advice
or activity most amenable to appeasing the credit algorithm is not necessarily
beneficial to the consumer—for example, because length of credit history is
an important factor in credit scoring, consumers may be advised not to close
older credit accounts, even if those accounts are unused or unneeded.  Simi-
larly, because total available credit is an important scoring metric, credit
score guidance may advise against closing any available accounts even if they
are no longer needed (and possibly create greater exposure to identity
theft).
A second well-studied example of commensurate algorithmic practices,
familiar to many readers of this Article, is the yearly practice of commensu-
rately ranking American law schools in the publication U.S. News and World
Report (USNWR).140  In this process, various qualities of law schools are first
quantified—reputation, bar passage rate, student quality, and other charac-
teristics are converted to quantities that are added together in a proprietary
mathematical calculus.141  The various chosen metrics, which may have little
causal or conceptual relationship to one another, are placed in a comple-
mentary and comparative relation to one another by means of a weighted
formula.  Other information about a school—the diversity of student body or
faculty, volunteer pro bono service, student satisfaction—is ignored or dis-
carded in the ranking procedure.142  The resulting ranking metric, and the
138 See Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 565.
139 Kear, supra note 100, at 350–52.
140 See Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coup-
ling and Organizational Change, 74 AM. SOCIO. REV. 63 (2009).  Although USNWR ranks only
accredited U.S. law schools, academic institutions around the world experience similar
effects from various forms of commensurate ranking. See Janet Chan, Fleur Johns & Lyria
Bennett Moses, Academic Metrics and Positioning Strategies, in METRIC CULTURE: ONTOLOGIES
OF SELF-TRACKING PRACTICES 177 (Btihaj Ajana ed., 2018).
141 Espeland & Sauder, supra note 128, at 10; Robert Morse, Ari Castonguay & Juan
Vega-Rodriguez, Methodology: 2021 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-
schools-methodology.
142 Wendy Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Diversity, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC.
JUST. 587, 604 (2009).
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known inputs fueling the metric, become associated with the school, shaping
perceptions of the school.143
As in the credit scoring example, behavior is changed by the realign-
ment and decontextualization of the quantified characteristics in law school
rankings.  For instance, the quality and quantity of applications to a ranked
school are dramatically affected by student reliance on the score.144  Moreo-
ver, the schools’ programs, organization, and expenditures related to the
defining metrics are unavoidably and profoundly altered.145  Widespread
acceptance of the ranking system creates strong incentives to invest in the
measured characteristics, such as the provision of deep discounts or “merit
scholarships” to students with desirable test scores.146  The rankings generate
little incentive to invest in disfavored characteristics, such as volunteer pro
bono activity—indeed, such expenditures are effectively penalized for divert-
ing resources away from the favored metrics.147
Even though the law school ranking and credit scoring examples rely on
algorithmic processing that does not necessarily involve machine learning,
the general cognitive and social characteristics of commensuration remain
the same in the AI context.  It should thus be clear from this summary that
algorithms as described above extend, instantiate, and perpetuate the
processes of commensuration that are at work in society generally.148
Indeed, the algorithmic processes described above can be seen to act as a
type of technical prosthesis for the more general social process of commensu-
ration, extending the properties of human capacity.149  Algorithmic scoring
quantifies, simplifies, categorizes, and relates different datasets together as
part of its operation, but the numerical output of the algorithmic process
then serves as a starting point for further social commensuration.  And, as
with every other social process embodied in computer technology, the speed,
scope, and effect of commensuration are magnified and enhanced by pas-
sage through the machine.150
Thus, algorithms incorporate and extend a larger set of reflexive social
practices, defined to include any social response to a measurement that
changes the object being measured.151  An additional reflexive social effect
associated with algorithmic processing is the generation of self-fulfilling
143 Sauder & Espeland, supra note 140, at 72.
144 Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effect of U.S. News &
World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105,
122–24 (2006).
145 Sauder & Espeland, supra note 140, at 71.
146 Espeland & Sauder, supra note 142, at 601–602.
147 Sauder & Espeland, supra note 140, at 73–74.
148 Espeland & Stevens, supra note 127, at 315–16.
149 Cf. Clive Lawson, Technology and the Extension of Human Capabilities, 40 J. THEORY
SOC. BEHAV. 207 (2010) (reviewing arguments regarding technology as amplifying or sup-
plementing bodily functions).
150 See LAURA J. GURAK, CYBERLITERACY: NAVIGATING THE INTERNET WITH AWARENESS 29
(2001).
151 See Espeland & Sauder, supra note 128, at 3.
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prophecies.  This occurs when the algorithm changes social activity and per-
ceptions in a way that confirms its own analytical output or prediction by
means of performative loops: the algorithm does not merely reinforce, but
actually recreates existing social opportunities or liabilities.152  For example,
algorithmic scoring is known not merely to correspond to, but to reinforce
differences in wealth, class, education, and race.153  Scored individuals
become trapped in positive or negative feedback cycles as their scores
prompt behaviors that validate the score.
As illustrations, I turn again to well-documented examples, such as that
of American credit scoring.  Impoverished or marginalized social groups who
systematically receive lower credit scores are deemed by virtue of the score to
constitute a greater credit risk, resulting in more stringent terms for credit, at
higher interest rates.  When imposed upon a population that is already
impoverished, such lending strictures naturally contribute in a higher rate of
default, substantiating the algorithm’s prediction of credit risk.154  Thus
credit scores do not merely predict default, but actually facilitate default.155
The score does not simply indicate or reflect objective risk; rather, when
actively employed as tool to mitigate risk, the scoring algorithm fulfills its
own prediction.156
Similarly, so-called predictive policing analyzes inputs deemed relevant
to criminal activity in order to optimize the deployment of law enforcement
resources in neighborhoods that have been algorithmically calculated to
offer the highest risk of future crime.157  But deployment of such resources
according to the algorithm affects the incidence of crime encountered in the
areas identified by the algorithm.158  This should not be surprising; the pres-
ence of more personnel and higher degrees of surveillance in the location
naturally contributes to the detection and apprehension of misconduct, ful-
filling the algorithm’s prediction of heightened criminal activity.159
We might similarly expect, in the practice described above of predictive
scoring for child protective services,160 that the algorithmic inspection, scru-
tiny, and judgment of parents predicted to place their children at risk would
produce stressed and irritable parents who are more likely to become angry
or make mistakes.  This may in fact place their children at greater risk,
prompting the need for intervention of protective state institutions.  As in all
of these examples, the algorithmic metric is not a detached or neutral evalua-
152 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 18; Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at
570.
153 See PASQUALE, supra note 3, at 15, 38; Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 33, at 618.
154 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 567.
155 See Akos Rona-Tas, The Off-Label Use of Consumer Credit Ratings, HIST. SOC. RSCH., no.
1, 2017, at 52, 62.
156 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 15.
157 Moses & Chan, supra note 7, at 808; Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data
Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 113–14 (2017).
158 See Moses & Chan, supra note 7, at 810.
159 Id.; Selbst, supra note 157, at 141.
160 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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tion system.  The algorithmic system is instead embedded in the social sys-
tems it is deployed to predict or assess, and so will certainly perturb the
function of those systems, just as those systems perturb it.
III. ALGORITHMIC MARKETS
Although the reflexive characteristics of algorithmic profiling are dra-
matic, they are only one example among numerous known socially reflexive
practices that facilitate behavior conforming to their own predictions.161
Other commensurate practices are known for creating social outcomes that
conform to the expectations embedded in the metrics intended to measure
them.162  Perhaps the best-characterized examples of such effects are found
in detailed studies of financial markets, where predictive algorithms alter not
only behavior but in fact alter the social structures that produce such behav-
iors.163  In particular, due to characteristics such as numerical quantification
and description, economic institutions display strongly commensurate and
self-fulfilling prophetic qualities.  These qualities are likely to be reinforced
when coupled with algorithmic profiling; thus, the most notable displays of
the recursive impact of predictive algorithms have been documented in these
areas.164
The impact of predictive algorithms in finance offers not only a graphic
illustration of recursive processes in action, but an illustration that is pro-
foundly entangled with the problem of legal metrics because the logic of
financial algorithms is carried directly over to legal algorithms.  First, propos-
als for personalized legal metrics adopt the technology and techniques for
market personalization in determining legal status, and carry with them the
characteristics of market personalization.165  Indeed, many of the areas
where algorithmic legal metrics have been proposed, such as contract, tort,
or intellectual property law, are legal domains where private market ordering
is typically part of the expected operational rationale, which animates the
translation of market mechanism into legal institutions.166  Second and not
coincidentally, because of decades of pervasive economic analysis of law in
the United States, both theory and doctrine of American jurisprudence are
thoroughly permeated with the assumptions that animate such economic
analysis, so that even public ordering is typically conceived of under para-
digms of economic rationality.  And third, economic rationales share with
machine learning certain problematic assumptions that reinforce one
another when the two intersect.
161 Espeland & Sauder, supra note 128, at 11.
162 Id.
163 See Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 442.
164 Id.
165 See Cohen, supra note 18, at 66; Yeung, supra note 18, at 264–65.
166 See Cohen, supra note 18, at 66.
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A. Algorithmic Performativity
As an explanatory matter, it may be most helpful to expand on the third
point first: the shared assumptions underlying both economic and predictive
algorithmic modeling.  In many senses, the juxtaposition of algorithmic scor-
ing with neoclassical economic models seems a natural ideological match.  As
I have pointed out in previous work, the nascent literature on personalized
law relies upon algorithmic technological intervention as deus ex machina—
both literally and figuratively—to instantiate the neoclassical pipe dream of
zero transaction costs and perfect information.167  Ubiquitous surveillance
systems are envisioned to provide boundless data inputs; transcendent
machine learning is envisioned to predict optimal regulatory responses.
Such prognostications vastly exceed the engineering capacity of any feasible
future implementation,168 but are fairly typical of what has been termed a
“magical worldview” that underestimates the costs and overpromises the
results of AI implementation.169
But the algorithmic metric proposals considered here rest on an even
deeper set of congruencies between economic and algorithmic practice.
There is, as we shall see, considerable compatibility between the analytical
abstraction entailed in algorithmic profiling and the economic abstraction of
the rational actor on which personalized law proposals are premised.170  For
example, algorithmic profiling seems “scientific” in the sense that it is
expressed as numerical output that purports to objectively measure underly-
ing patterns of social activity, in much the way that investigation of the physi-
cal world purports to objectively measure underlying patterns of material
activity.171  Economics, too, has long relied on analogous (and dubious)
assumptions of objective observation in developing its analytical apparatus,
particularly those offshoots of economic analysis that have taken root within
the legal academy.172
Similarly, the collection and integration of data profiles for predictive
metrics relies upon the idea that they reflect an underlying rational, efficient,
and knowable actor whose preferences can be forecast and manipulated in a
defined and predictable fashion.173  This postulated actor would be perfectly
167 See Burk, supra note 26, at 288–89.
168 See Cooper & Levy, supra note 20.
169 See Elish & boyd, supra note 41, at 73–74; see also Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn, Mar-
cel Goguen & Tony Porter, Big Data and Algorithmic Governance: The Case of Financial Prac-
tices, 22 NEW POL. ECON. 219, 220 (2017) (labeling as “techno-utopian” the optimistic view
that algorithmic governance will “overcome the imperfections of politics and faulty forms
of knowledge”); Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 436 (describing the romantic notion that
machine learning will transcend unruly and chaotic data inputs).
170 See Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 20.
171 See Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 433 (noting that machine learning processes assume
the existence of stable and distinct external categories).
172 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV.
147, 149–50 (2000).
173 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 20.
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at home in neoclassical economic modelling.  The proposal that consumer
profiling can be established via predictive data analysis assumes that there
exists a static and fixed set of consumer preferences that can be derived from
the data trails that individuals leave in their wake, much as within the struc-
ture of economic modelling, the neoclassical premise of the “rational actor”
constitutes a parallel assumption regarding a defined subject with predict-
able, intrinsic categorical preferences.  Deployment of algorithmic predic-
tion assumes that there are intrinsic preferences present to be detected, as
does the assignment of consumers to a position on the economists’ demand
curve.174
To some degree these synergies between economic rationales and
algorithmic design may, when conjoined, amplify the most dubious features
of each.  The premise of algorithmic divination of intrinsic consumer prefer-
ences should already be at least suspect, if not entirely discredited; we have
seen in the discussion to this point that algorithms cannot be said to discover
or extract intrinsic quantitative properties.  To the contrary, they reflexively
shape the outcomes that they predict or report.175  On the economic side, I
will not belabor here the dubious premise of the rational actor—despite its
surprising persistence, this has been shown repeatedly to constitute a serious
deficiency in policy analysis and prescriptions drawn from economics.176  But
as Yochai Benkler notes, the concept of exogenous, freestanding preferences
has never been a reasonable assumption in contemplating consumer behav-
ior, and this fiction reaches new levels of absurdity in the face of algorithmi-
cally profiled markets.177  Indeed, the absurdity is enormously amplified
when the electronic speed and reach of algorithmic systems is engaged.
However, having already outlined above the reflexivity effects attending
algorithmic profiling, I need now to underscore the parallel reflexivity
problems attending neoclassical economic premises that to a significant
degree animate the proliferation of automated algorithmic metrics.  As Ste-
phanie Bair has pointed out in some detail, rationality and the rational satis-
faction of preferences show problematic signs of behavioral reflexivity.178
What we deem rationality is neither fixed nor immutable, but rather changes
with the circumstances in which an individual finds him or herself.179  Prefer-
ences are not static, but dynamic.  It is not simply that the individual may
gain access to better or worse information on which personal preferences
depend, nor that the individual’s attitude may change depending on the situ-
174 Id. at 23.
175 See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Hodgson, On the Limits of Rational Choice Theory, ECON.
THOUGHT, no. 1, 2012, at 94, 94; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behav-
ioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 790 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
177 Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, DAEDALUS, Winter 2016, at 18,
23–24.
178 Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Malleable Rationality, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 17, 19–20 (2018).
179 Id. at 20.
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ation: the brain actually rewires its neural pathways depending upon environ-
mental stresses and experiences.180  “Rationality” is thus the product of social
circumstances that we create; law and policy shape our attitudes and prefer-
ences at a biological level.  When we base social policy on “rational” prefer-
ences we may be dynamically altering or cementing the preferences on which
the policy supposedly depends in a mutable feedback mechanism.181
On a broader scale, such recursive effects are even more troublesome
with regard to the concept of the economic “market.”  Because of its distinc-
tive character, economics may display some of the strongest reflexive social
effects entailing both commensuration and self-fulfilling prophecies.182  Eco-
nomics routinely reduces social relations to quantified numerical and acon-
textual representations.  Unlike physical phenomena, which to be studied
must be instrumentally quantified, the subject matter of economic analysis is
inherently quantified, in the form of numerical data drawn directly from the
phenomena studied—corporate profit, net income, or market surplus entail
numerical representations that are intrinsic to the activities of corporations,
income, or markets.183  These commensurate concepts are highly portable
because of their numerical representation; because they have been rendered
context-free and appear authoritative, such quantified representations can be
quickly redeployed into new contexts and may quickly become adopted
outside their initial circumstance.184
These numerical representations are in turn the quantities that are
affected and manipulated by the economic models that process them.  As a
consequence, there is evidence that, far from describing preexistent or
immanent phenomena, economic models serve to induce and engender the
phenomena that they purport to describe.185  This performativity thesis, as
articulated by Callon and advanced by subsequent researchers, postulates
that the formal models and techniques developed in economics are responsi-
ble for the market characteristics they compose.186  Economic models, like
180 See Richard J. Davidson, Katherine M. Putnam & Christine L. Larson, Dysfunction in
the Neural Circuitry of Emotion Regulation—A Possible Prelude to Violence, 289 SCI. 591, 594
(2000). See generally Todd A. Hare, Colin F. Camerer & Antonio Rangel, Self-Control in
Decision-Making Involves Modulation of the vmPFC Valuation System, 324 SCI. 646 (2009); Todd
F. Heatherton & Dylan D. Wagner, Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure, 15 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCIS. 132 (2011).
181 See Bair, supra note 178, at 33–34.
182 Cf. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 128, at 11–12, 16.
183 Duncan K. Foley, The Strange History of the Economic Agent, 1 NEW SCH. ECON. REV. 82,
82 (2004).
184 Kear, supra note 100, at 347.
185 Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa & Lucia Siu, Introduction, in DO ECONOMISTS
MAKE MARKETS?  ON THE PERFORMATIVITY OF ECONOMICS 1, 4–5 (Donald MacKenzie, Fabian
Muniesa & Lucia Siu eds., 2007); Kieran Healy, The Performativity of Networks, 56 EUR. J.
SOCIOLOGY 175, 177–78 (2015).
186 Michel Callon, Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics, in THE
LAWS OF THE MARKETS 1, 2 (Michel Callon ed., 1998); DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT
A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE MARKETS 12–20 (2006); Donald MacKenzie &
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other human technologies—whether wheels, or lenses, or amplifiers, or
transmitters, or antibiotics that serve as prosthetics to extend and enhance
endowed human capabilities—appear to serve as “cognitive prosthetics”
allowing their users to engage in calculative techniques demanded by the
models.187  Thus, in at least some cases, and possibly with some frequency,
economic models in fact perform the theories they articulate, creating rather
than discovering the characteristics of the market relationships that are the
focus of disciplinary study.
Such performativity has been tied to a range of effects in the market-
place, from merely conceptual changes to complete restructuring of mar-
kets.188  At the most modest level, dubbed generic performativity, economic
theories or concepts are adopted by market actors other than economists,
changing those actors’ views on market policy and activity.  Economic con-
cepts that have a more substantial impact on the market by altering practices
may be labeled as effective performativity.  The very strongest performativity
effects, known as Barnesian performativity,189 creates a type of self-fulfilling
prophecy or substantive feedback loop in which the application of the theory
produces its own predictions.190
In this strongest, Barnesian form, performativity effects are not merely
behavioral changes arising from the ideological indoctrination into the
assumptions embedded in the models, although certainly this may occur.191
For example, behavioral economics has shown that individuals who are
exposed to undergraduate economics theories become more selfish, or
“rational,” in line with the expectations of those theories to which they are
exposed.192  Certainly the implementation of predictive economic models
changes the behavior of market participants in such ways.193  But Barnesian
performativity effects are not merely generic or effective changes in attitude
or behavior; rather, they alter social market practices on a wide scale.  Thus,
when transported into financial practice, the capabilities arising from eco-
nomic models can cause markets to increasingly resemble the assumptions,
behaviors, and predictions embedded in the models.194
Yuval Millo, Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial
Derivatives Exchange, 109 AM. J. SOCIO. 107, 107–108 (2003).
187 Michel Callon & Fabian Muniesa, Economic Markets as Calculative Collective Devices, 26
ORG. STUD. 1229, 1238 (2005). See Lawson, supra note 149 (discussing technology as
extending or supplementing bodily capabilities).
188 MACKENZIE, supra note 186, at 18–19.
189 Id. at 165–66.
190 Barry Barnes, Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction, 17 SOCIO. 524, 536–38 (1983).
191 See MACKENZIE, supra note 186, at 19.
192 Healy, supra note 185, at 194.
193 See Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 442.
194 See MacKenzie et al., supra note 185, at 6–7.
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B. Calculated Consumers
What I have described above regarding the performativity of markets,
and the numerical models that drive such performativity, bears directly on
our understanding of the effects of algorithmic legal metrics.  The numerical
models on which each are based are not merely value-laden, but value-imple-
menting.  The introduction of numerical models alters and shapes the social
contexts in which they operate.  Such effects constitute a clear contradiction
to the assumptions under which numerical models are adopted in economic
conception of the market, and under which such models are carried into
legal or regulatory practices.
Like the general corpus of neoclassical economic work on which Ameri-
can law and economics is founded, proposals for algorithmic determinations
are based upon the supposition that markets are neutral fora in which par-
ticipants exchange whatever capital endowments they happen to possess:
property, skills, or other assets.195  Within this idealized, immanent, and
spontaneous forum, participants are assumed to exchange goods according
to their innate or inherent preferences.  The corollary to this axiom is the
assumption that, to the extent market exchanges may be biased, they reflect
biases carried over from historical legacies, social attitudes, or inequalities
derived from nonmarket structures.196  To the extent that neoclassical mod-
els recognize that markets entail social relations, it tends to assume away such
relations, either ignoring them entirely, or, on the rare occasions when they
are acknowledged, treating them as a “transaction cost” or impediment to
the otherwise ideal and frictionless operation.197
But on more careful consideration, it is to the contrary clear that what is
deemed “the market” is actually a complex social system comprised of a con-
glomeration of equally complex social mechanisms for commodifying, valu-
ing, and characterizing goods so that they can be associated and reassociated
with different participants.  Markets, whether digital or physical, are reliant
for their function on elaborate systems of calculative practices.  This is true
whether the market in question is a grocery store, an open-air bazaar, an
electronic trading exchange, or an internet platform.  There is nothing neu-
tral, immanent, or impassive about such practices.
For example, the characteristics of goods, which allow the good to be
traded on the market, are neither inherently present nor externally
195 See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
927–28 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978); cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1315 (1989) (explaining gender
wage gaps on the argument that “[t]he average woman will therefore [due to family and
childbearing] invest less in her human capital, causing her wage to be lower than the
average man’s, since a part of every wage is repayment of the worker’s investment in
human capital”).
196 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 560.
197 Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91
AM. J. SOCIO. 481, 484 (1985).
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attached.198  They are rather constructed by the interaction of market enti-
ties via processes that render the good subject to calculation.  “Calculation”
in this sense has little to do with mathematics, but rather to do with the pro-
cess of qualifying social relationships so as to render a given entity the object
of market exchange.199  Calculability is a fundamental characteristic of prod-
ucts and services in the marketplace, but since it is not an intrinsic character-
istic it is must be created by the action of interconnected forces that make up
the market.  Objects are transformed into marketable goods by a social pro-
cess of definition that imbues them with the perceived characteristics neces-
sary for transfer from the seller’s context to the buyer’s context.200
Thus, as Callon and Muniesa have shown in a series of pathbreaking
studies, markets accomplish calculation by elaborate processes of isolation,
classification, and association— removing goods from one context, grouping
them with other objects or persons, and associating them with a different
context in order to achieve a transfer from one social situation to another.201
Calculability includes stabilization of the goods’ perceived qualities and rela-
tionships, rendering them definite and fixed so that property rights can be
applied and transferred to the discrete object.202  Objects must be rendered
“calculable” in this sense in order to be transferred through the social mecha-
nisms that comprise the market.  Market processes entail a complex network
of calculative agencies—labels, shopping baskets, salespeople, displays, pack-
aging, advertisements, receipts, bar codes, wallets, debit cards, warranties,
cash registers, and far more—that are engaged in rendering objects as calcu-
lable goods.203
Commensurate processes are fundamental to enabling such calculation.
In particular, the kind of predictive analytical scores we have been consider-
ing here facilitate the determination and calculation of risky market entities.
The score provides as a common reference point, a number offering the illu-
sion of stable objective verity for an unknown quantity—future results.204
The flattening of heterologous data creates the expectation that everything
that can be reduced to bits is calculable, and the illusion that future uncer-
tainty has been transformed to predictability.205  This permits stable and
determinative negotiation among market participants, allowing markets to
function as if the future were in fact knowable.206  Allocation of risk is then
based on the existence of an entity that purports to predict risks, allowing the
198 Callon & Muniesa, supra note 187, at 1234.
199 Id. at 1231; see also Paolo Totaro & Domenico Ninno, The Concept of Algorithm as an
Interpretive Key of Modern Rationality, THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y, July 2014, at 29, 30 (“[T]he
concept of calculation is very general and does not necessarily imply the manipulation of
numerical symbols.”).
200 Callon & Muniesa, supra note 187, at 1233–34.
201 Id. at 1231–32.
202 Id. at 1233.
203 Id. at 1238.
204 Kear, supra note 100, at 352.
205 Amoore & Piotukh, supra note 54, at 361.
206 Kear, supra note 100, at 352.
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social relation of risk to become attached to a technical object—the
algorithm.207  In this fashion the algorithmic system becomes a technical
prosthesis performing a calculative task—risk prognostication—that could
otherwise not occur.
Thus, it has become increasingly clear that algorithmic data profiling
has an intimate relationship with the partitioning, classifying, and associative
social functions of markets.208  Computer algorithms characterize, isolate,
classify, aggregate, and enumerate representations of goods, including repre-
sentations of human individuals, which are then framed and reframed in
social spaces in accordance with the rules established by such algorithms.209
Surveillant algorithms thus constitute calculative devices in this sense; they
organize and govern processes by which market entities are rendered calcula-
ble, integrating the actions of a discrete set of calculative agencies.210  And
this effect is not separate or discrete from surveillant algorithmic processes in
other contexts: the proposals to algorithmically quantify legal status propose
the same systems, to the same end, which is to produce a calculable citizenry.
Understanding the functioning of algorithms in the market, and the
prospect for parallel functions in the legal system, necessarily brings us to
examination of the assumptions underlying algorithmic markets, which will
be embedded in proposed algorithmic legal metrics.  We have seen in the
discussion above that although neoclassical economics assumes that markets
are neutral and immanent, and that market actors are rational with endoge-
nous preferences, in fact, both markets and the preferences of their partici-
pants are structured by social forces.  Increasingly, such forces include the
effects we have identified from algorithmic profiling.  Profiling flattens and
decontextualizes the information it processes, creating rather than simply
measuring the metrics it reports.  The resulting reflexive characteristics of
algorithmic profiling create an environment of calculated self-surveillance
that fills in the vacuum left by ostensibly neutral economic assumptions.
It is thus possible to draw a straight line from the accumulation of sur-
veillant data through the reflexive effects of algorithmic scoring to the self-
discipline of the emerging digital market structure.  Given that the produc-
tion of algorithmic scores reinforces self-surveillance, we may ask what this
means for market behavior.211  A serious concern is whether businesses may
intentionally exploit the reflexivity effects described here in order to strategi-
cally restructure consumer preferences so as to shunt behavior into the busi-
nesses’ preferred consumption pattern.212  There is some evidence that this
207 See id. at 353.
208 See Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveil-
lance Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213, 214 (2018); Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 10.
209 Callon & Muniesa, supra note 187, at 1242.
210 See id.
211 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 568.
212 See Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms?  Siphoning Rents,
Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions,
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 597–603 (2019); Yeung, supra note 18, at 263; Karen Yeung,
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is occurring.213  Of course, the algorithmic effects I have described here are
expected to occur whether or not they are intended, merely by the deploy-
ment of algorithmic ranking systems, whether for wise or nefarious or
entirely unanticipated purposes.  But it is increasingly clear that these effects
are increasingly intentional, anticipated, and largely nefarious.214
Thus, the current data-driven “platform economy” thrives within the sur-
veillant assemblage, extracting value from surplus or collateral information
generated by routine activities.215  The aggregation, processing, and extrac-
tion of collateral data is enabled through situation of consumer activity
within the surveillant assemblage.216  Certain other business models, such as
the fitness tracking Fitbit data device, rely even more explicitly on such self-
surveillance incentives to sell devices and services.217  These businesses delib-
erately leverage the reflexive nature of algorithmic quantification to induce
voluntary, deliberate self-surveillance as a proxy for self-improvement, gener-
ating ongoing tracking metrics for health, learning, or other user activity.
The devices or services offer commensurate scoring for the user’s accom-
plishments, in effect creating a dynamic “accomplishment double” as a stand-
in for the actual user activity.
On either such business model, the goal is to condition users to data
tracking, commensuration, and reflexive response, to produce calculated
consumers from which value can be extracted in the marketplace—value
both in the form of payment for the self-surveillance service, and in the form
of the data that can be repurposed for the benefit of the service supplier.218
The induced pursuit of algorithmic metrics thus becomes a site for self-invest-
ment along the parameters dictated by the algorithm.219  Classified individu-
‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 118, 119
(2017).
213 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1003–18
(2014); Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden
Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 4–7 (2019); see also Abbey Stemler,
Joshua E. Perry & Todd Haugh, The Code of the Platform, 54 GA. L. REV. 605, 633–38 (2020)
(describing behavioral manipulation by platform businesses).  Much of the documented
user manipulation in platform business models involves behavioral “nudges” designed into
platform architecture. See, e.g., id.  The algorithmic effects I consider here are to the con-
trary constitutive and pervasive.
214 See Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Informa-
tion Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015).
215 See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 140–43
(2017); Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 11.
216 Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 33, at 615–16.
217 See Katelyn Esmonde & Shannon Jette, Assembling the ‘Fitbit Subject’: A Foucauldian-
Sociomaterialist Examination of Social Class, Gender and Self-Surveillance on Fitbit Community Mes-
sage Boards, 24 HEALTH 299 (2020).
218 Aristea Fotopoulou & Kate O’Riordan, Training to Self-Care: Fitness Tracking,
Biopedagogy and the Healthy Consumer, 26 HEALTH SOCIO. REV. 54 (2017).
219 See Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 20.
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als are trained to become entrepreneurs of themselves220 by absorption into
the surveillant network.
The algorithmic outputs around which the market is constructed are
both market derived and market oriented.221  They create classifications,
which in turn are the basis for new classes, new social divisions with life
chances tied to each particular classification.222  As an integral part of their
operations, markets generate boundary classifications, where a particular
individual or group of individuals is included or excluded from certain types
of transactions.223  Such processes appear to be endemic to the market,
which competitively measures and sorts participants, separating and recom-
bining them into market categories to which different economic rewards or
punishments are attached, and from which profits can be most efficiently
extracted.224  Rather than reflecting or echoing social class, such processes
may actually serve to create social classes.225
Although market mechanisms have long imposed such classification on
participants, algorithmic self-surveillance accelerates and leverages such
processes.  Sociological analysis of market functions provides compelling evi-
dence that markets increasingly are intentionally structured so as to stratify
and create social differences by means of what have been called classification
situations, that is, by the imposition of strategic class differentiation in a man-
ner that alters the opportunities of those on whom the classifications are
imposed, including affecting their access to markets.226  Comparative scoring
produces graduated or continuous classifications in which individuals are
placed on a scale with metrics tied to ranked transaction levels: higher or
lower insurance premiums, favorable or unfavorable interest rates, better or
worse levels of privilege or service.  These two types of classifications are
never entirely separate; graduated classifications have cutoff or threshold
points that demarcate categories of transactions, including complete exclu-
sion from transactions.227  Such profiles affect the life chances of the individ-
uals whom they categorize, resulting in loans approved or refused,
employment offered or denied, differential terms of service allowed or disal-
lowed, access permitted or restricted, prices presented at favorable or unfa-
vorable rates.228
220 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE
FRANCE, 1978–79, at 226 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2008); see also
Dorthe Brog .ard Kristensen & Minna Ruckenstein, Co-Evolving with Self-Tracking Technolo-
gies, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 3624, 3625–26 (2018) (examining the characteristics of the
“Quantified Self” improvement community).
221 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 22.
222 Id.
223 See Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 564.
224 Id. at 560–61.
225 Id. at 561.
226 Id. at 560.
227 Id. at 564–65.
228 See Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 22.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 35 18-JAN-21 11:28
2021] algorithmic  legal  metrics 1181
The power of such market stratification has been enormously amplified
by the availability of massively pervasive data gathering and analysis systems—
indeed, by precisely the kind of systems that would form the basis for any of
the proposed schemes for predicting or personalizing legal status, and the
implications for algorithmic personalized law are manifest in the current dig-
ital marketplace.  The purpose of private-sector surveillance and algorithmic
profiling is to develop systems of categories that will maximize profit extrac-
tion from the individuals profiled.229  These categories are constructed
according to the logic of extraction, and the opportunities made available to
those slotted into the categories will be configured on the same basis.230
Consumer data, which is to say consumer data doubles, and ultimately con-
sumer activity, is rendered calculable via such classification.231  Rather than
surveilling consumers to guess at their preferences from their point of view,
predictive analytics now surveils them in order to classify them according to
the producer’s point of view.232
Thus, much of the use of surveillant algorithmic scoring in the market-
place is oriented toward the creation of self-monitoring calculative selves.233
Rather than the state discipline described by Foucault, this is a market disci-
pline.234  Rather than being oriented toward the imposition of social order-
ing, the internalized redefinition imposed by private predictive market
surveillance is oriented toward exploitation and extraction.235  Some previ-
ous commentators have recognized that the data gathered by private surveil-
lance may differ in quality and purpose from that gathered by the state.236
But within the current surveillant assemblage, there is little division between
data profiling by the market or by the state; public and private sources are
combined for algorithmic processing.  And the disciplinary effect internal-
ized by the subjects of algorithmic commensuration is common to public or
private profiling.
IV. BIAS AND REFLEXIVITY
This brings us back to the problem of bias, or more properly, to the
problem of inequity.  The impact of calculative algorithmic self-surveillance
has fallen and will continue to fall unevenly across different population seg-
ments.  We have already seen that algorithmic processing cannot produce
neutral profiles or objective scores, but is unavoidably biased, often in unpre-
dictable ways.  A number of thoughtful previous commentators have put sub-
229 See id.
230 Id. at 14.
231 Cohen, supra note 208, at 228.
232 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 23.
233 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 564.
234 Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text.
235 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1916 (2013); Fourcade &
Healy, supra note 41, at 25.
236 Niva Elkin-Koren & Michal S. Gal, The Chilling Effect of Governance-by-Data on Data
Markets, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 407–08 (2019).
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stantial consideration into certain aspects of such algorithmic bias.237  These
critiques have employed the term “bias” in a variety of ways, addressing a
variety of potentially discriminatory influences in algorithmic processing.238
Oscar Gandy catalogs several such sources of bias in automated systems, rang-
ing from imperfect data and erroneous data processing to the disparate
impact of rational data processing outputs.239
One recurring, prominent, key concern in the existing literature on
algorithmic systems is whether machine learning may reproduce social biases
due to tainted or incomplete data inputs; as the old data processing maxim
says, garbage in, garbage out.240  Such bias could occur in the data used to
train the system, or in the data actually analyzed through the system.  Of
course, data are always biased in some fashion; as Bowker famously observed,
data are never raw, but are always collected and adapted to some purpose.241
It is possible that the training or processed data might be intentionally
“cooked” so as to produce socially biased results.  But probably such inten-
tional data discrimination would be rare.  Rather, the primary common con-
cern found in existing critiques of algorithmic data processing revolves
around the inadvertent production of “inaccurate” profiles of its subjects.
Thus, on this view of bias, the question is whether the predictive system
is “fit for purpose,” that is, whether the outputs are accurate with regard to
the intent or “fit” with the phenomena that the algorithm is attempting to
predict.  I have already discussed in this Article at least three types of
algorithmic processing problems that might contribute to the accuracy con-
cern.  First, as I have shown above, data collection is never uniform or com-
prehensive.  The sprawling expanse of the surveillant assemblage is uneven
and selective, differentially harvesting information according to the caprice
of class, race, geography, profession, age, and activity.  Entire populations
may be visible, invisible, or distorted by data perception.
Second, algorithmic scoring might be unintentionally skewed by the nec-
essary “cooking” that Bowker identifies.  The process of joining, sorting, cate-
gorizing, and analyzing ingested data as described above is unavoidably
biased.  By necessity the processing algorithm discards or subordinates infor-
mation deemed unimportant.  Critically, because machine learning systems
develop and execute their own analytical criteria, whether supervised or
unsupervised, it may be impossible to know exactly what information is dis-
237 Gernot Rieder & Judith Simon, Big Data: A New Empiricism and Its Epistemic and Socio-
Political Consequences, in BERECHENBARKEIT DER WELT?  PHILOSOPHIE UND WISSENSCHAFT IM
ZEITALTER VON BIG DATA 85, 92 (Wolfgang Pietsch, Jörg Wernecke & Maximillian Ott eds.,
2017) (summarizing critiques of data analytics).
238 See David Danks & Alex John London, Algorithmic Bias in Autonomous Systems, 26
INT’L JOINT CONF. ON A.I. 4691 (2017).
239 Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Engaging Rational Discrimination: Exploring Reasons for Placing
Regulatory Constraints on Decision Support Systems, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29 (2010).
240 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 683–84 (2016).
241 See GEOFFREY C. BOWKER, MEMORY PRACTICES IN THE SCIENCES 184 (2005) (“Raw data
is both an oxymoron and a bad idea; to the contrary, data should be cooked with care.”).
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carded or decontextualized, or exactly how the resulting output is biased as a
result.242
These forms of bias are simply unavoidable, and the second may be
humanly incomprehensible.  This inevitability is to a greater or lesser extent
recognized by previous commentators, who anticipate some inherent data
discrimination, but who then assume that the bias problem could be fixed if
the system is fit for purpose, if it accurately predicts the intended target
behaviors.243  One palliative measure frequently suggested is a kind of due
process standard that would allow subjects to contest and correct their
profiles so as to make the data fairer or more accurate.244  A related sugges-
tion is to implement a kind of “algorithmic affirmative action” that would
proactively ameliorate whatever socially detrimental effects occur due to
biased algorithmic outputs.245
Such suggestions, as indicated at the outset of this Article, are intended
to address problems of governance by algorithms.246  But they do not engage
the third source of algorithmic bias identified here: the reflexive and
performative nature of algorithmic metrics.  In the process of machine learn-
ing, information is selected, ranked, matched, reconfigured, and evaluated
according to its social use, and predictive algorithms then recursively look for
social use correlations among decontextualized inputs.247  The algorithmi-
cally derived rules generated by the machine learning process are ultimately
determined by the social practices that generate the processed data.248
Thus, obtaining unbiased algorithmic predictions is not a question of “clean-
ing up the data” or somehow filtering either training or analytical data for
social biases.  This insight is key: the very notion of predicting social behaviors from
correlations to past social behaviors necessarily captures whatever biases are incorpo-
rated into past social behaviors, reinscribing them into predictions about future
behaviors.
Thus, the inescapable bias in predictive algorithms stems not from inac-
curacies in the data or in the data processing—although they are surely
there—but from the distortions inherent in the entire project of predictive
social correlations.  Certainly, the accuracy of data profiling may be a serious
and legitimate concern that must be taken into account in assessing propos-
als such as reliance on algorithmically generated legal metrics.  But this is for
the most part not my concern in this Article.  To the contrary, I fear that the
vilification of data profiling due to potentially mistaken or inaccurate profiles
242 See Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learn-
ing Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 6–7.
243 See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 24; Zalnieriute et al., supra note 1, at
453–54.
244 Citron, supra note 90, at 1301–13; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 19; Kate
Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive
Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109–28 (2014).
245 See Chander, supra note 45, at 1039–41.
246 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
247 See Parisi, supra note 27, at 102.
248 See id. at 109.
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largely misses the point: algorithmic determinations are socially mediated,
embedded in and determined by the social meanings attributed to their
underlying processes.249
Consequently, I am primarily concerned here with a distinct, intractable,
and inevitable set of costs in the operation of algorithmic data processing,
which is that it engages a set of social mechanisms leading to reflexive quanti-
fication, manipulative self-discipline, and ultimately to calculated publics.
These effects are fed by the accuracy problems identified by previous com-
mentators, but concerns regarding reflexive effects are not necessarily con-
cerns regarding accuracy.  To the contrary, all profiling systems, even if
considered “accurate” for the purpose of their design, will produce the type of detrimen-
tal internalization feedback effects that I describe here.  Even if data profiles can be
“fixed” or improved for accuracy, this does not address the set of issues I
ultimately engage with in this Article.
Consider as a specific example the development of “personalized”
algorithmic negligence scoring as described above.250  Some commentators
have argued that data profiling might be used to tailor tort incentives to the
individual, using algorithmic scoring to adjust the standard of care required
for negligence liability.251  They argue, for example, that some data profiling
research suggests an ability to algorithmically predict risky behavior, such
that profiles might be considered in setting an individualized standard of
care.252  The assumption in the “personalized tort” analysis seems to be that
such risk assessments measure static and inherent behavioral qualities of the
individual.
Yet such a project occurs within an inescapable social framework.  Recall
the discussion above regarding the malleable nature of rationality and prefer-
ence.253  There is a growing body of empirical evidence supporting the con-
clusion that poverty changes cognitive functions, leading to suboptimal or
antisocial behaviors.254  Impoverishment narrows the cognitive focus of its
victims, inhibiting long-term planning and prompting objectively imprudent
activity.255  Impoverished people perceive options and circumstances radi-
cally differently than would a wealthier person facing similar choices.256  Sub-
stantial evidence suggests that these effects are biologically rooted, that the
249 Id. at 92.
250 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
251 See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 13, at 679–80.
252 Id. at 682–83.
253 See supra notes 178–84 and accompanying text.
254 See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE
MEANS SO MUCH  41–42 (2013); Anandi Mani, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir & Jiay-
ing Zhao, Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCI. 976, 976 (2013); Anuj K. Shah, Sendhil
Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 SCI. 682, 682
(2012).
255 Shah et al., supra note 254, at 684.
256 See Anuj K. Shah, Jiaying Zhao, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Money in the
Mental Lives of the Poor, 36 SOC. COGNITION 4, 5 (2018).
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brain chemistry and neural pathways of those subjected to severe resource
limitations change in response to such stresses.257
Thus we would expect that the classic “reasonably prudent person stan-
dard” from negligence law will be experienced differently across different
social strata.  What is reasonable to a person with abundant resources will be
different than what is reasonable to a person with impoverished or con-
strained resources.  The individual who has experienced severe resource scar-
city may be more likely to behave carelessly, to make mistakes, to ignore or
overlook precautionary measures.  Taking such differences into account
might be advanced as a goal of “personalized” negligence law.  However,
explicitly embedding personalized scoring in the imposition of tort liability
can be expected to reinforce and recreate such social differences.  Just as
credit scoring produces “personalized” interest rates and loan terms, tailored
to the algorithmic identity of the consumer,258 so “personalized” tort reme-
dies may be expected in a similar fashion to be distributed differentially
across social classes, with different impacts on impoverished or subordinated
groups.
Further, as seen in the case of existing calculative metrics such as credit
scoring, we can anticipate that algorithmic legal scoring will inevitably
obscure or discard certain types of information in favor of other types.  Given
the stark differences in data profiling across differently situated social classes,
and in particular the differences in profiling according to wealth, it would
undoubtedly be the case that any algorithmically generated legal metric
score will entail gaps in its dataset.  The poorest are the most likely to fall into
such datafication blind spots, meaning for example that those least able to
pay for the imposition of algorithmically determined negligence liability are
those most likely to be flagged—accurately or inaccurately—by an
algorithmic negligence profile.
Thus, even if an individual is “correctly” flagged as potentially negligent,
reflexivity creates a strong likelihood that a data-matching score for negli-
gence would tend to cement someone labeled with such a score into the
category of “imprudent” persons.  Being treated as a negligent or risky sub-
ject will reinforce and exacerbate the social stresses that led to the classifica-
tion in the first place.  The impoverished subject who matches the negligence
profile is likely to remain impoverished due to increased financial stress stem-
ming from the algorithmic determination itself.  We might for example
257 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.  Perhaps not surprisingly, children who
grow up in impoverished circumstances show altered brain development. See Martha J.
Farah et al., Childhood Poverty: Specific Associations with Neurocognitive Development, 1110 BRAIN
RSCH. 166, 168 (2006); Daniel A. Hackman & Martha J. Farah, Socioeconomic Status and the
Developing Brain, 13 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 65, 65 (2009); Kimberly G. Noble et al., Family
Income, Parental Education and Brain Structure in Children and Adolescents, 18 NATURE NEUROS-
CIENCE 773, 775 (2015); Kimberly G. Noble et al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Neurocognitive
Development in the First Two Years of Life, 57 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 535, 545 (2015).
258 See DONNCHA MARRON, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 151 (2009).
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expect that the individual with an unfavorable algorithmic negligence score
could quickly find herself subject to higher insurance premiums (or perhaps
stripped of insurance), or subject to higher civil or criminal liability for pos-
ing a social risk.  While this would in some sense validate the prediction of
the algorithm, the algorithm becomes a contributing factor to its own
prediction.
And because commensurate rankings are highly portable, they tend to
quickly migrate to contexts outside of their original setting.  The unintended
proliferation of algorithmic scores is apparent, for example, in the increasing
incidence of “off-label” uses of credit scores outside of credit decisions,
extending to employment vetting, security screening, and even dating.259
Thus, we might anticipate that the individual with an adverse algorithmic
negligence score might also be vetted more stringently for a driver’s license
(if not denied a license altogether), subject to enhanced police scrutiny, and
otherwise carefully observed for anticipated careless behavior.  The same pat-
tern holds for other status predictions; we would expect similar effects for
persons whose score predicted a need for social services, for child-protective
observation, or other anticipated misbehavior.  What we know about the
social operation of algorithmic scoring suggests that even if personalized
behavioral-valuation scores did not begin as an explicit social differential,
they would rapidly become such.
A. Perfidious Transparency
We have now established that the bias in algorithmic systems lies not so
much in their fidelity or infidelity to some objective state of the world, but
rather in the feedback loop constituting social shaping of algorithmic input
and the corresponding shaping of social perceptions by algorithmic output.
Much of the critical literature to date addressing commensurate algorithmic
practice has called for greater transparency: for open examination of the
data or the mechanics involved in automated decision-making systems.260
This argument, as we have seen above, is aimed at the problem of govern-
ance of algorithms,261 and is similar to those typically applied to democratiz-
ing or inhibiting powerful institutional actors; the underlying supposition is
that social damage will be lessened if a governance mechanism’s use is
acknowledged and its functioning is understood.262  On this view, biases,
omissions, and disparate representation could perhaps be corrected if
exposed and identified in the data or data processing of automated systems.
Despite their salutary prospects, the feasibility of such transparency pro-
posals is doubtful, as the technical and social positioning of algorithmic
259 See Rona-Tas, supra note 155, at 52–53.
260 See Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City,
20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 107–08 (2018); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 8, 10–11;
Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 54,
58–59 (2019); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1568.
261 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
262 See Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency, supra note 2, at 3.
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processes obstinately resists such transparency.263  First, there are powerful
market incentives for the owners or employers of such algorithms to keep the
workings of their system proprietary and confidential, in order to maintain
market advantage.264  The design of algorithmic systems, the training data
and methods of training, and the databases on which the systems operate are
all likely to constitute valuable trade secrets, entailing substantial investment
of time, capital, and resources, but easily copied by competitors if disclosed.
Thus, private entities in particular are likely to resist requirements for
disclosure.
However, a subsequent, second layer of impediment is likely to be more
important: even when disclosure is conceded or mandated, the disclosed
code is unlikely to be understood by legislators, judges, and policymakers, let
alone the average citizen.  Disclosure of incomprehensible technical details
will not empower either the average citizen or institutional decisionmakers to
make autonomous choices about algorithmic systems.  Rather, those empow-
ered to make social choices regarding such algorithms must likely rely on the
understanding communicated by experts who are in a position to make first-
hand assessment of the disclosed algorithmic details.265  This situation is not
altogether unusual where decisions about technical subjects must be made,
but unquestionably imposes additional costs, delays, and impediments that
may negate many benefits of disclosure.
Finally and most significantly is the problem of algorithmic processing
inscrutability: as described above, metrics generated via machine learning are
typically based on functions developed without explicit human direction or
oversight.266  Even if the process of data extraction and evaluation is dis-
closed, and even if experts are available to interpret it for lay decisionmakers,
those experts will generally not know why automated systems develop the
abductive rules that they do.267  As described above, machine learning sys-
tems develop their own criteria and determine their own results.  This is gen-
erally considered to be an advantage of the system, but the disadvantage is
that it is frequently impossible to understand exactly how the system reached
the particular output it did, even if its functional mechanism is under-
stood.268  Some version of the first two impediments attend almost any new
technological development, but this third impediment in particular offers
263 Burrell, supra note 242, at 10; see also Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without
Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability,
20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 978, 981–83 (2018) (explaining why transparency is inade-
quate for oversight of algorithms).
264 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 658 (2017).
265 Anton Vedder & Laurens Naudts, Accountability for the Use of Algorithms in a Big Data
Environment, 31 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTS. & TECH. 206, 208 (2017).
266 See supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text.
267 See Burrell, supra note 242, at 5; Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive
Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2018).
268 See Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 436 (noting that rendering predictive processes visi-
ble is a central challenge for machine learning).
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significant reasons for skepticism about any degree of meaningful
algorithmic transparency.269
But set such impediments aside for the moment, recalling that the pur-
pose here is to interrogate the problem of algorithmic governmentality.270
Assuming that transparency is even achievable, my analysis here raises a dif-
ferent set of questions, indicating that the proffered solution of algorithmic
transparency may lend itself to highly problematic, even negative social
effects.  Transparency is touted as the palliative for the failure of algorithmic
accuracy.271  But algorithmic transparency can be conceived as compromising
scoring accuracy—if the subjects of algorithmic scrutiny are aware of the fac-
tors considered by the algorithm, they may be able to alter the outcome of
the scrutiny in predictable ways, so as to manipulate or “game” the out-
come.272  The algorithmic score may then be viewed as inaccurate or
prejudiced by the subject’s deliberate alteration of data inputs.273
As a consequence of the potential for such algorithmic “gaming,” some
commentators have cautioned against transparency of algorithmic processes,
at least in some instances and perhaps in all, warning that consumers who are
aware of the parameters for algorithmic scoring might alter their behavior to
“game” the system and produce desirable metrics.274  In some instances an
advantageous manipulation might constitute a favorable algorithmic assess-
ment; in other cases an advantageous manipulation might constitute avoid-
ance of the algorithm altogether.275  The parade of algorithmic gaming
horribles that are recited to support this view is led by potential manipulation
or evasion of algorithms intended to monitor safety, national security, or
other ostensibly compelling protective purposes.276
Other commentators in response have discounted the likelihood of such
consumer gaming, arguing that even if consumers know the components of
an algorithmic output, advantageously affecting those outcomes is difficult,
so that the benefits of transparency outweigh the occasional manipulation of
269 Cf. Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 35, 37 (2013) (observing that the complexity of algorithmic systems will
preclude transparency alone from eliminating bias).
270 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency, supra note 2, at 16 (discussing tradeoffs
between transparency and accuracy).
272 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 30; Kroll et al., supra note 264, at 658.
273 See Kroll et al., supra note 264, at 658; Zarsky, supra note 260, at 1554.
274 Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22
(2018); Kroll et al., supra note 264, at 657–58.
275 The gaming of algorithmic metrics thus partakes of what Leo Katz dubs “avoision,” a
legal and moral gray area between legitimate avoidance and illegitimate evasion. See LEO
KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW, at
ix–x (1996).
276 See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 274, at 33; Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King,
Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 43 (2013); Zarsky, supra note 260,
at 1554.
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algorithmic outcomes.277  But each of these views overlooks the effects
described here.  Both the gaming concern and its response are couched pri-
marily in terms of algorithmic accuracy, that is to say, they revolve around the
ability or inability of the measured subject to skew the algorithm away from
an accurate metric.  This largely misses the critical characteristics of
algorithmic scoring as deployed in the private sector, and as practiced in the
public sector, which is to strategically reshape the meaning of metric
produced.
Consequently, my concern here is the alternative and contrasting view
that such algorithmic manipulation might be advanced as a useful feature
rather than as a flaw.  Allowing or encouraging the surveilled subject to
rework the factors affecting algorithmic output is a strategy that can be repre-
sented as a tool for real or perceived personal achievement.  Knowing the
factors that are calculated in the algorithm allows the subject to deliberately
alter those factors, thus producing a more favorable score.  To the extent one
believes that the algorithmic output reflects actual status, improving the
score may be correlated with personal improvement.  The paradigm business
model for such personalized algorithmic discipline is the Fitbit device, by
which users voluntarily submit to digital monitoring in order to track and
improve algorithmic scores regarding their health and physical fitness.278
But other examples of deliberate encouragement of score alternation, such
as “improvements” in personal credit scores, or in U.S. News and World Report
law school rankings, are plentiful.
Some commentators have excluded such algorithmic self-discipline from
the problem of “gaming,” naively assuming that such self-improvement track-
ing poses no threat because it confers social benefits, such as better health, or
better personal finances, that result from greater scoring accuracy.  This view
ignores the social construction of the algorithmic process and its output,
assuming that algorithmic scoring in fact reflects some cognate state in the
real world.  But whether or not this assumption is correct in any given
instance, all such personalized behavioral conformation constitutes forms of
panoptic self-discipline, altering personal behaviors due to algorithmic sur-
veillance.  And in examples such as the Fitbit device, we also unquestionably
see instances of market discipline, in which consumers are induced to rely
upon and change their behavior according to a particular algorithmic busi-
ness model.279
These two approaches, of algorithmic gaming as inaccuracy and
algorithmic gaming as a goal, entail radically different underlying assump-
tions regarding algorithmic quantification.  The position that proper
algorithmic metrics are threatened by reactive effects assumes that what is
being measured by the algorithm is a static or inherent characteristic in the
world.  The alternate approach assumes that the algorithm measures a
277 Ignacio N. Cofone & Katherine J. Strandburg, Strategic Games and Algorithmic
Transparency (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
278 See Esmonde & Jette, supra note 217, at 300.
279 See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text.
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changeable or dynamic property such that the measurement may be properly
harnessed to change behavior.280  This is a typical tension within socially
reflexive, reactive practices: the conception of a given measurement as a neu-
tral and inherent representation of the world, and the conception of that
measurement as a vehicle for monitoring accountability and effecting desired
performance.281
We can discern each of these positions, and their effects, in the example
of American credit scoring.  We have already said something about the biases
and social stratification pervasive in the practice of credit scoring.282  Trans-
parency of credit scoring criteria and credit scoring practices might be
thought to offer a solution to combat such biases, or at a minimum to iden-
tify and understand them.283  The initial position of the financial services
industry regarding such transparency as to the algorithm was that disclosure
of the scoring criteria would compromise accuracy by allowing the subjects of
the assessment to manipulate their own scores.284  Later, this position
changed, and a measure of credit scoring transparency was embraced as a
means to allow consumers to deliberately engage in market behaviors that
would elevate their credit scores.285  The altered consumer behavior was
accepted as a way to achieve better credit access, and by improving consum-
ers’ histories of financial activity, allow them to gain enhanced access to
financial products.286
It is worth noting that the shift in conception of credit scoring is unlikely
to have occurred because of a sudden enlightenment or concern for consum-
ers, either on the part of credit scoring agencies or on the part of their com-
mercial-lending-institution subscribers, regarding the autonomy of the
scored populace.  One rather suspects that the change occurred in order to
expand the market, either for the financial products of credit scoring sub-
scribers, or perhaps the market for credit scores themselves.  Allowing the
subjects of credit scoring to improve their scores provides a greater number
of customers eligible for the financial products on which the loans depend.
And of course, in order to improve their scores, the subjects of scoring need
to know and self-monitor those scores, which are typically provided for a fee.
This should make clear that transparency of algorithms may be a strate-
gic move on the part of algorithmic decisionmakers, facilitating the deliber-
ate employment of commensurate and self-fulfilling social processes to the
advantage of the decisionmaker.  Some previous commentary has recognized
280 Espeland & Sauder, supra note 128, at 7.
281 Id.
282 See supra notes 100–09 and accompanying text.
283 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 24 (advocating transparency as a curative
to credit scoring inequities).
284 Cf. Kear, supra note 100, at 361.
285 See Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 565; see also Donncha Marron, Debt, Con-
sumption and Freedom: Social Scientific Representations of Consumer Credit in Anglo-America, HIST.
HUM. SCIS., Oct. 2005, at 25–26 (describing the shift in social perception of personal debt
from a moral problem to a financial tool to an individual entitlement).
286 Kear, supra note 100, at 361.
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that decisionmakers may behave strategically by hiding algorithmic bias in
order to avoid accountability, or might disclose algorithmic features in order
to deter gaming by subjects.287  These concerns again relate to algorithmic
accuracy.  But I have shown here that disclosure may represent deliberate
behavior in a “long game” by those deploying the algorithm: not to avoid
responsibility for poor accuracy, nor to discourage input gaming by those
subjected to algorithmic surveillance, but rather to purposely manipulate the
behavior of algorithmic subjects toward some desired surveillant disciplinary
outcome.  Indeed, careful analysts of the new “data-driven” economy have
observed precisely this type of disciplinary strategy.288
Algorithmic discipline is not merely a business strategy, although it may
be exploited as such.  To the extent that transparency in predictive algo-
rithms is feasible, transparency as to inputs facilitates self-direction of
algorithmic scoring, determining whether the score is positioned as dynamic
or static, autonomous or destined, aspirational or conditional, normative or
descriptive.  Bias figures into the picture not as a matter of decisional accu-
racy, but primarily as it serves to create differential opportunities for the
wealthy and the impoverished to deliberately shape their calculated “data
doubles” by engaging in recorded behaviors intended to affect algorithmic
scoring.289  And to the extent that these effects may be exploited in the mar-
ket, algorithmic transparency may actually facilitate such exploitation.
As a consequence, calls for algorithmic transparency in order to improve
accuracy are to some extent orthogonal to the reflexive effects that I have
outlined here; we must expect reflexivity costs to occur whether or not algo-
rithms are transparent.  But far from objectively describing or predicting
social behavior, or even simply influencing social outcomes, algorithmic scor-
ing constitutes a tool for deliberately manipulating self-determination.
Transparency of algorithmic inputs results in algorithmic outputs such as the
credit score, not to mention metrics such as the self-surveillant Fitbit output,
becoming situated as dynamic self-improvement projects reflecting the moral
fiber of the individual.290  When considered in the context of algorithmic
legal scoring, transparency becomes a normative and moral consideration,
and not necessarily in a beneficial way.291
B. Quantified Performance
The reflexive biases described here lead inexorably to an additional set
of issues arising from the proposed use of algorithmic scoring to determine
legal status: the implications of such scoring for normative or moral expecta-
287 See Cofone & Strandburg, supra note 277, at 3–5.
288 See Cohen, supra note 215, at 148, 151; Marion Fourcade, The Fly and the Cookie:
Alignment and Unhingement in 21st-Century Capitalism, 15 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 661, 672 (2017);
Zuboff, supra note 214, at 75.
289 Kear, supra note 100, at 363.
290 MARRON, supra note 258, at 193.
291 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 100, at 18.
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tions.292  These issues proceed, again, directly from the known social and
cognitive dynamics of quantification, but have particular importance for
algorithmic calculations situated in a legal determination.  Quantification,
such as that undertaken by an algorithmic scoring system, always implies sort-
ing or categorization.293  Algorithmically determining an individual’s legal
character, such as negligence or reasonable prudence—even assuming a
credible determination were possible—would by definition require measure-
ment and comparison of the consumer’s predicted characteristics or behav-
iors against the those of other individuals.  The entire project assumes that
the profiled subject, and those against whom the subject is compared or from
whom the subject is distinguished, fit into stable categories.  As described
above, machine learning assumes the presence of stable and distinct catego-
ries that can be detected by pattern analysis; the system learns to discern
distinctions among the features of such fixed categories.294
Such an assignment of classification or categorization, although couched
in seemingly objective numerical representation, is never a neutral or endog-
enous act; it is rather a value-laden imposition of a particular social order on
its subjects.295  Such values are, as we have seen, embedded in the processes
that produce numerical outputs.296  This is in part the concern articulated by
many commentators regarding covert bias in the processing of surveillance
data.297  But regularized measurements also acquire new meanings derived
from the social roles that they inevitably take on.  Such infusion of value judg-
ments into metrics proceeds, again, by means of well-known social mecha-
nisms.  Imposition of any type of category, with its accompanying categorical
standard, necessarily elevates some viewpoints and suppresses others.298
Items that resemble one another may be categorized together, but what it
means to “resemble” one another is the outcome of a contested social pro-
cess.299  Indeed, the process may well be inverted, as items that are classified
together become socially perceived as similar, and items that are classified
apart from another become socially perceived as different.300  Such percep-
292 In a recent commentary paralleling my critique here, Philip Bender has relatedly
questioned the normative gaps in personalized law conjectures. See Bender, supra note 19,
at 2.
293 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 42, at 289.
294 Mackenzie, supra note 1, at 433.
295 See supra notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 237–39 and accompanying text.
298 GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 5 (1999).
299 See HARRIET RITVO, THE PLATYPUS AND THE MERMAID AND OTHER FIGMENTS OF THE
CLASSIFYING IMAGINATION, at xii–xiii (1997).
300 See ÉMILE DURKHEIM & MARCEL MAUSS, PRIMITIVE CLASSIFICATION 81–82 (Rodney
Needham ed. & trans., 1963).
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tions eventually crystalize as “social facts” that perpetuate themselves and
undergird broad networks of normative belief and behavior.301
Quantified categorization is a frequent social process, and the imposi-
tion of categories may occur pursuant to a number of different classificatory
purposes.  But even when directed to different ends, categories are volatile
and to some degree interchangeable.  To distinguish their epistemic and
social functions, Marion Fourcade divides categorical ranking systems into
three broad purposive goals: first, those rankings that are nominal, catego-
rizing their subjects according to the characteristics of the item ranked; sec-
ond, those that are cardinal, which categorize according to quantified
metrics; and third, those that are ordinal, which rank objects relative to one
another.302  These three systems rely on ostensibly different criteria, but
despite their operational differences, there is considerable slippage at the
intersection of these systemic types.
For example, ordinal rankings are relative rankings, but such rankings
typically imply valuations by which subjects, including persons, are ranked
relative to one another: performance, intelligence, quality, efficiency, and so
on.  Relative ordinal rankings thus imply nominal categorization according
to subject characteristics and slip into becoming effective nominal rankings.
Ordinal rankings also quickly become quantified into numerical hierarchies,
and so morph into ostensibly cardinal rankings.  And, just to complete the
circle, the metrics associated with cardinal rankings frequently become per-
ceived as characteristics of the items ranked, and so blur into a nominal
ranking.
Thus, to illustrate, if I award a particular student the highest grade in the
class, that cardinal ranking quickly slips into a relative ordinal ranking with
respect to the other students—the ordinal ranking may be granular, such as
ordering the students as first, second, third, and so on, or it may be more
clustered, such as ordering the “A” students, the “B” students, and so on.
Probably the ordinal ranking will be based on some cardinal ranking, such as
grade point average or class “participation points.”  To the extent that either
the ordinal or cardinal ranking is attributed to superior intelligence or effort,
it rapidly becomes a nominal ranking for the “best” or “brightest” or
“smartest” student in the class.  And of course the lowest rankings quickly
become nominalized as well, labeling such students as the dullest or laziest.
These effects are socially pervasive and can be expected to manifest
themselves in proposed legal metrics, where slippage between different types
of rankings is likely to occur due to the embedded assumptions undergirding
assigned legal status.  Consider again the example of personalized negligence
prediction and the conceptual baggage that comes along with it.  Negligence
301 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 50–51, 74 (Steven Lukes
ed., W.D. Halls trans., 1982); see also ALAIN BADIOU, NUMBER AND NUMBERS 2–3 (Robin
Mackay trans., 2008) (observing that “whatever produces number can be culturally
located”).
302 Marion Fourcade, Ordinalization: Lewis A. Coser Memorial Award for Theoretical Agenda
Setting 2014, 34 SOCIO. THEORY 175, 176–78 (2016).
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is in the current era most often conceptualized in terms of utility, framed as
economic efficiency.303  That framework is the dogma associated with the
application of the famous “Learned Hand inequality” from United States v.
Carroll Towing, which has become an iconic algebraic expression of optimiza-
tion for the costs of spending on safety against the costs of accidents.304
Within that framework, the market behavior of individuals, such as a given
individual’s propensity to carelessness, or willingness to pay for safety precau-
tions, is typically treated as a nominal or essential quality that serves to order
private exchanges as discussed above with regard to rationality and
preferences.305
Under the neoclassical economic tort models on which negligence pre-
dictive proposals are ultimately based, an individual’s willingness to invest
time or resources in a given behavior is treated as an endogenous characteris-
tic of that individual, and as such may be considered as an intrinsic nominal
categorization.  But to the extent that this categorization arises out of the
numerical mastication of data profiles by an algorithm, it will be treated as a
cardinal category, as simply an ordering of consumers along a demand curve
as reflected by their assigned metrics.306  The quantification of the ranking
may, however, additionally be seen as comparative, ordinally ranking one
consumer relative to another.  And such relative technological ranking of the
individual lends itself ultimately to nominality, in which the algorithmic score
becomes an indicator of self-management and “reasonably prudent” behav-
ior, reflecting consumers’ preferences and safety investment as manifest in
the ordinal algorithmic score.307
Thus, categorical cognitive slippage across classifications means that
there will inevitably be attribution of moral or normative meaning to
algorithmic scoring.  Because the algorithmic score, whether purporting to
represent creditworthiness, intelligence, popularity, or trustworthiness,
appears objective, any positive or negative change will be attributed to the
character or actions of the individual being scored rather than to bias, feed-
303 The literature characterizing tort law in this fashion is enormous; the most germinal
work is likely GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
24, 26–29 (1970). See also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85–89 (1987) (explaining negligence law in terms of economic
efficiency).
304 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (expres-
sing the conditions for tort liability as occurring where the burden of safety precautions is
less than the magnitude of potential harm times the probability of harm, B < PL); see also
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 303, at 85–89 (characterizing negligence law in terms of the
Learned Hand inequality); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163–66 (4th
ed. 1992) (same).
305 See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text.
306 See Christopher Townley, Eric Morrison & Karen Yeung, Big Data and Personalized
Price Discrimination in EU Competition Law, 36 Y.B. EUR. L. 683, 684 (2017).
307 See Fourcade, supra note 302, at 188–89; see also Lury & Day, supra note 77, at 29
(discussing the translation of ordinal ranking into personal optimization).
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back, or variance in the algorithm.308  Algorithmic metrics appear to objec-
tively reflect chosen behavior, and so become an ethically significant
indicator of individual character.309  Algorithmic calculation thus helps pre-
cipitate a shift from measurement to judgment.  The algorithmic result comes to
quantify individual performance, which is recorded and represented as a
stream of autonomous choices.310  Credit scores, fitness monitoring, and
other algorithmic metrics come to imply the responsibility to control one’s
own providence, using algorithmic quantification as the measure of self-
determination.311
These effects are accelerated by the deployment of algorithms intended
for self-surveillance and algorithmic discipline, as illustrated by the examples
above.312  And as should also be clear from the negligence example, coup-
ling algorithmic quantification with the hollow premises of neoclassical eco-
nomics reinforces this effect.  We have seen that the ostensibly neutral
assumptions of economic models are not blank slates, but instead are rapidly
imbued with social meaning.313  Once the assumption of plentiful, even per-
fect information supplied by Big Data is accepted, then under neoclassical
models, behavior can no longer be ascribed to bounded rationality or imper-
fect information.314  Rather, any behavior must be considered to constitute
informed choices reflecting manifest preferences, and the outcomes of the
behaviors are deserved.  Outcomes then become viewed as morally chosen
and deserved consequences.315  Algorithmically quantified behaviors become
viewed as indicators of autonomous decisions, individual merit, and social
worth.
Thus, algorithmic scoring delivers something besides a neutral numeri-
cal metric.  Returning again to the example of economic categorization, met-
rics such as the American credit score entail a moral dimension, assigning to
the recipient an implicit level of trustworthiness, self-discipline, and social
status that affects the recipient’s economic and social opportunities, includ-
ing employment, investment, and dating opportunities.316  To the extent
that these social valuations are considered to be based on measurements,
they may be ascribed to ostensibly neutral cardinal rankings.317  But to the
308 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 25.
309 Id. at 24.
310 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 100, at 565–66.
311 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 24.
312 See supra notes 229–36 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 170–81 and accompanying text.
314 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 24.
315 Id.
316 See, e.g., Michelle Singletary, When It Comes to Dating, Where Might Bigger Really Be
Better?  Credit Scores, WASH. POST, May 14, 2017, at G04; see also Jane Dokko, Geng Li &
Jessica Hayes, Credit Scores and Committed Relationships 1 (Fed. Rsrv. Sys. Fin. and Econ. Dis-
cussion Series, Working Paper No. 081, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econ-
resdata/feds/2015/files/2015081pap.pdf (exploring positive correlation between high
credit scores and relationship longevity).
317 Fourcade, supra note 302, at 178.
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extent that valuations are perceived as based on characteristics of the subject,
they may be ultimately understood as objective or natural nominal rank-
ings.318  We may expect that an algorithmic categorization for legal metric
such as negligence, culpability, or reasonableness will similarly collapse
under its own weight into a comparable moral singularity, even if the mea-
surement is ostensibly neutral.  And consequently, using such scores to affect
legal status implicates the moral framework underlying such status.
V. CALCULATED CULPABILITY
We turn then finally from normative judgments to legal judgments, to
considering the intersection between algorithmic legal metrics and the moral
framework undergirding legal decisionmaking.  The known progression of
cognitive slippage from quantification toward evaluation, expectation, and
judgment has profound implications for both the proliferation of quantifying
algorithmic systems and for proposed responses to such proliferation.  If, as
Fourcade and Healy argue, social processes transform algorithmic metrics
into “moral injunctions,”319 then the use of algorithmic legal metrics must
unavoidably alter the construction of juridical injunctions.  Legal metrics
provide a cardinal categorization of their subjects, but this will slip into ordi-
nal, comparative categorization of their subjects.  As this characterization in
turn slips toward nominal categorization, becoming a moral characterization
or judgment of the subject, it infects the moral or normative judgments made
by legal decisionmakers.
The negligence liability example used above illustrates this intersection;
we have already seen how algorithmic negligence metrics will eventually slide
toward nominal categorization, implicating the inherent responsibility or
irresponsibility of the subject.320  Yet because it is inextricably linked to ordi-
nal or comparative ranking among citizens, the assumed preference for safety
or risk spills into the public sphere, comparing the individual’s quantified
prudence to the normative expectations of other individuals.321  Negligence
tort liability in particular is intended as private ordering in the service of
public order, engaging privately initiated legal claims to redistribute the
social costs of harmful activity.  But categorization slippage means that rea-
sonably prudent behavior will never be merely viewed as a matter of social
efficiency, but rather also as a matter of personal qualities and accountability.
The slippage in treatment of legal metrics thus invokes a dichotomy fun-
damental to democratic society: liberal democracies simultaneously assert
that the autonomy and individual worth of the person are to be respected,
while at the same time asserting that no one is entitled to privileged treat-
318 Id. at 179.
319 Fourcade & Healy, supra note 41, at 24.
320 See supra notes 303–310 and accompanying text.
321 See Fourcade, supra note 302, at 180.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 51 18-JAN-21 11:28
2021] algorithmic  legal  metrics 1197
ment under the law.322  Democratic regulation becomes illegitimate when it
is arbitrary, but may be equally illegitimate when it is impersonal and calcu-
lated—too much personal variation violates democratic principles of equal-
ity, but too little violates liberal principles of autonomy.323  An “unjust” legal
regime may mean a regime that undervalues either the former or the latter.
To maintain democratic legitimacy, the imposition of a “personalized”
legal category must therefore accommodate both autonomy and social equal-
ity.324  From this standpoint, legal liability based on a nominally character-
ized “personalized” or “granular” negligence score may seem to depart from
values of equality under which actors are all subject to uniform law.  At the
same time, ordinal treatment of the score may seem to depart from values of
autonomy, under which the individual is autonomously valued.  Significantly,
the judgment of liability quite separately carries with it a strong deontological
sense of culpability or blameworthiness.  As Herbert Morris observed in the
criminal context, a finding of guilt or liability is in some sense a backhanded
recognition of a defendant’s autonomy—this is denied to minor children or
those lacking autonomous mental capacity, who are deemed unable to exer-
cise the self-determination necessary to enter into contracts or to commit
crimes.325
This raises a familiar question as to the purposes of legal liability:
whether a judgment of such legal status constitutes a statement of blamewor-
thiness or merely a utilitarian tool of deterrence.  The former role for legal
determination assumes a particular type of moral responsibility and implies
that the subject could and should have made different choices, might feel
remorse, might make better future choices, might improve himself.  The lat-
ter role for legal determination does not necessarily preclude any of those
concepts, but is largely indifferent to guilt so long as infringement is
deterred, either specifically or generally.  On an economic version of utilitari-
anism, the imposition of a particular judgment should create and reinforce
incentives that will most efficiently distribute social resources.
The issue of culpability may be especially problematic when the decision
regarding the defendant’s liability is based on an algorithmically scored met-
ric.  I have shown above that algorithmic scoring is anything but neutral or
objective, even though the bland numerical appearance of a score lends itself
to objective characterization.326  However, the characteristics of algorithmic
scoring that I have reviewed above—including, ironically, their ostensible
neutrality—tend toward moral inferences regarding the autonomy of the
scored individual.327  There is considerable evidence that sorting and classifi-
322 See Andrew Abbott, The Future of the Social Sciences: Between Empiricism and Normativity,
71 ANNALES HSS 343, 352 (2016); Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments, 21 POL. THEORY
390, 400 (1993).
323 See Bender, supra note 19, at 62.
324 See id. at 54, 62.
325 See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 485, 493 (1968).
326 See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 306–09 and accompanying text.
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cation schemes never confine themselves to objective application, no matter
how neutral their intent.328  Rather, the nature of classification and ranking
systems lends itself to moral labelling, and such labelling is a commonplace
and well-studied characteristic of the emerging algorithmic society.329
We should therefore fully expect that this type of labeling will occur
should we embark on negligence or other liability rankings, especially since
not only algorithmic judgments, but a system of legal judgment, would have
been engaged in such a process.  Indeed, we should expect that the moral
valence of the legal judgment will be quickly infected by the imputed moral-
ity of quantification, described above.330  To the extent that a judgment of
legal liability entails a finding of blameworthiness, tying such liability to a
standard generated by quantified behavior poses both practical and jurispru-
dential conundra: Is the “personalized” metric on which legal status would be
based intended as a representation of the consumer’s intrinsic character or
as a target for self-surveillant adjustment?
We have seen that either view may be sustained by algorithmic scoring.
The score itself, although value-laden, does not dictate the purposes to which
those values are put when introduced into legal processes.  Take again the
example of the algorithmically personalized negligence score.  Assuming that
we treat the score’s metric of expected carelessness as a stable and inherent
quantity, what policy should guide the assignment of legal status arising out
of the algorithmic metric?  For example, should a score indicating a lack of
prudence mean that the subject’s negligence liability should be ratcheted up,
in order to increase that person’s incentives to take care, so as to bring him
closer to the average social expectation for safety?  Or should the standard in
fact be “personalized” in light of the score, in effect lowering the expectation
for prudent behavior, on the theory that the person should simply take the
degree of care that he reasonably can, given his inherent disability for
prudence?
One might of course fabricate the pretense of an answer to this dichot-
omy by draping it in the rhetoric of costs and benefits; advocates of personal-
ized negligence law have to some extent done exactly this.331  But set aside
the elaborate ruminations of economic analysts as to whether tort law should
or should not encourage improvement of those truly prone to negligence,
because their improvement might inefficiently cost more than the value of
gains to safety.332  Consider instead the normative expectations embedded in
the existing legal system and the known and knowable practices of the society
in which that system operates.  Either of the diametrically opposite outcomes
that I have identified is doctrinally plausible: the former approach effectuates
the liberal value of equality; the latter approach effectuates the liberal value
of individuality.
328 See supra notes 292–301 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 305–09 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 313–19 and accompanying text.
331 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 13, at 655.
332 See id. at 652–655.
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And, given what I have shown here regarding the portability of numeri-
cal commensurates, and the known social slippage of other algorithmic met-
rics such as credit scores, we might imagine that an adverse negligence score
will migrate to other settings, taken as an indicator that the individual is liter-
ally an accident waiting to happen.  Certainly we should expect that it would
quickly become the subject of pretrial discovery and evidentiary considera-
tion as an indicator of the defendant’s propensity toward negligence.  It
would not be implausible to anticipate that a sufficiently adverse score could
become the trigger for some type of presumption or evidentiary burden-shift-
ing along the lines of tort law’s current res ipsa loquitur doctrine, on the
theory that “the score speaks for itself.”
Assume now that we do not treat the score as measuring a static or con-
stant property, and instead adopt the view that whatever measurable ten-
dency toward carelessness an individual may possess is not an immutable
quality, but subject to personalized improvement.  If an algorithmic legal
score is considered dynamic rather than static, subject to alteration by the
person represented, in the manner of improved credit scoring, or “quanti-
fied self” calculative development, then consumers could presumably work to
achieve a “better” score.  As we have seen, this type of shift trades a view of
static, endogenous character for a cybernetic view that elevates assumptions
of autonomy—and here I use “cybernetic” in its original context, to desig-
nate a system of control or governance.333
But it is unclear what this would mean for quantified individuals caught
in the dilemma of algorithmic measurement.  For example, in constructing a
personalized duty of care, is the individual permitted to know the algorithmic
methods and factors that go into his negligence score?  Would doing so
“compromise” the tort score, or is the individual afforded the chance to
improve his algorithmic negligence prediction?334  If we view the score as a
changeable metric, might we expect the emergence of a class of “prudent
care coaches,” devoted to helping potential tortfeasors elevate their
scores?335  To the extent that the tort system is intended to foster prudent
and careful behavior, would such dynamic scoring achieve a goal of the sys-
tem, or might it prompt inefficient overinvestment in score manipulation
rather than efficient spending on safety?
These concerns are by no means limited to the problem of negligence
scoring, but rather present themselves wherever algorithmic scoring and
legal status meet.  Consider the example raised above of the individual who is
algorithmically identified as a proper target for social welfare services.336
333 See NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS: OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE
ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE 11–12 (2d ed. 1961); see also Yeung, supra note 3, at 507 (noting
that the roots of algorithmic regulation lie in cybernetics).
334 Cf. supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text (discussing the now-defunct concern
that transparent credits scoring could be manipulated).
335 Cf. supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (discussing the emergence of credit
score repair businesses).
336 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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The provision of public assistance has perennially been associated with a
morass of social judgments regarding self-sufficiency, personal competence,
responsibility, and autonomy.  The predictive score generated for such a per-
son might be taken as a measurement of the individual’s extrinsic circum-
stances indicating a need for assistance—or it might be taken as a
measurement of the individual’s intrinsic character indicating a need for
assistance.  In either instance, the intrinsic biases and distortions of the met-
ric become the pattern for the self, certified by the public administrative sys-
tem that generates and adopts the score.
Thus, would a “better” or more desirable welfare score be the score that
qualifies the subject for public assistance and welfare services, or would it be
the score that allows the subject to avoid qualifying for such assistance?  A
qualifying score would ensure the availability of assistance that might be des-
perately needed, but might also be perceived as a badge of personal failure
or irresponsibility.  Should the criterion for such scoring be made “transpar-
ent” to facilitate accuracy and governmental oversight, or would this allow
recipients to “game” the distribution of services?  Or should the algorithmic
metric be made transparent so as to be used as a “self-improvement” metric
to guide or encourage welfare recipients toward self-sufficiency?  Might a
transparent score be manipulated instead to embezzle public services—or
more likely, might it be perceived by fiscal watchdogs as being used in such
nefarious ways?
Consider as well a third example from current algorithmic governance:
Should the parent whose children are algorithmically deemed at risk be
transparently informed of the criteria and parameters for her administrative
profile?337  Should she be warned of the threshold calculation that will trig-
ger state intervention to remove the children from danger?  Would doing so
perhaps allow her to “game” the calculation so as to avoid the intervention,
placing the children at greater, surreptitious risk?  Or would disclosure, alter-
natively, provide a metric for self-improvement, quantifying her risky behav-
iors so as to prompt mitigation and conscious minimization of those
behaviors?  Should she perhaps be coached by social workers or private advi-
sors on how to obtain a better “abuse score” through behavioral modifica-
tion?  Determining such status on the basis of an algorithmic metric
effectively entails a policy choice between autonomy and determinism, shift-
ing the individual’s performance of self and legal institutional endorsement
of that performance.
We are then left to wonder: What incentives would be created by reli-
ance on algorithmic scoring?  Our understanding of human-algorithm inter-
actions tells us that algorithmic scoring of the tort defendant, the welfare
recipient, or the troubled parent would mark a change in agency, from quan-
tified subject to quantified object.338  Algorithmically determined legal scor-
ing might be intended to quantify a static and intrinsic metric.  But common
337 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
338 See Espeland & Sauder, supra note 128, at 7.
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experience tells us that human character is not static and that preferences
change, and we now understand that they will do so in part because of reac-
tivity to the algorithms themselves.  This does not merely present the prob-
lem of picking a particular point in time to assess a given data double, as
tricky as that determination might be.  A more serious anomaly is that the
classifications into which data doubles are slotted are dynamic, and the sub-
jects of legal metrics will begin to perform the classifications assigned by the
algorithms.  As Jonathan Simon once noted, such actuarial practices substi-
tute governance of moral agents for predictive analysis of risk, altering the
perception of self and community.339
Reflexive effects will occur on both sides of the evaluation, and indeed
within the structure of legal institutions themselves.340  Thus, although
algorithmic legal metrics might be intended to simply assist or enhance the
judgmental capability of the existing legal order, what we know of their oper-
ation indicates that they inevitably alter or entirely displace the normative
structures they are intended to quantify.  In either case the criteria and oper-
ation of the algorithm, as well as its mere presence in the network of legal
metric functions, serves to restructure decisionmaking and to restructure its
subjects into calculated citizens, to respond to their own quantification.
Deployment of algorithmic legal metrics threatens to supplant the underly-
ing assumptions of law, norms, and reason of neoliberal governance with
recursive behavioral protocols and performative algorithmic functions.341
CONCLUSION
The job of unpacking the intricate, concatenated effects of algorithmic
profiling is a complex and daunting task.  In this Article I have traced one set
of troublesome strands in the tangled skein: algorithmic processes, like eco-
nomic modeling, engage reflexive social processes to create their own social
facts.  When deployed in combination, these numerical modeling systems
reinforce one another to induce disciplinary behaviors in the social worlds
where they operate.  This will occur regardless of intent, but is increasingly
the basis for purposive restructuring of markets and market participants in
the service of what Shoshana Zuboff has termed “surveillance capitalism.”342
When deployed in a legal setting, we should similarly expect algorithmic dis-
cipline to intersect with the normative judgments of the legal system to pro-
duce perverse outcomes that will not be ameliorated by the most liberal
application of transparency, due process, or similar institutional palliatives.
In some senses, the reflexive outcomes I have detailed here are nothing
new; commensuration and related processes are ubiquitous social mecha-
nisms, operating in both automated and conventional social settings.  The
339 Simon, supra note 116, at 773; see also Yeung, supra note 18, at 266–68 (articulating
risks of algorithmic profiling to communal norms).
340 See Burk, supra note 26, at 305.
341 Parisi, supra note 27, at 94.
342 See Zuboff, supra note 214, at 75.
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corrosive effects associated with algorithmic metrics have always been present
in social processes, but these have been previously tolerable in the quantities
and frequency experienced at the scale and scope encountered via normal
human interaction.  The worst effects of past social metrics could even be
kept in check by a known institutional mechanism of the sort commentators
are now invoking, such as due process, notice, and transparency.  Indeed,
many of the illustrations I have used, such as university ranking or credit
scoring, antedate automated quantification.
But this familiarity makes the absence of any consideration of such
effects in the deployment of algorithmic legal metrics all the more shocking.
And it makes all the more worrisome the panoply of effects that attend auto-
mation of reflexive processes, the features of automated decisionmaking that
are indeed new: the scope, reach, and speed of automated systems; their per-
vasive illusion of objective numerosity; the heightened opportunity for slip-
page between judgment and measurement; the shifting of political and social
accountability to the machine; and the potential abdication of value judg-
ments to technical design choices.
Previous commentators have noted some of these features in commer-
cial settings and have expressed the concern that algorithms and related
information technology may allow the clandestine manipulation of the users;
they worry that such manipulation violates or subsumes autonomy, and so
erodes certain fundamentals of liberal democracy.343  This is a credible con-
cern with extremely serious implications, closely related to the construction
of “calculated publics” that I discuss above.344  But my concern here goes
much farther: in the context of legal metrics, algorithmic systems, whether
deemed manipulative or not, will inevitably have caustic effects in the context
of legal determinations, which entail certain theories about autonomy, and
which are subverted by the operation of algorithmic scoring systems.
Absent recognition of such dangers, the prospect of employing predic-
tive algorithms to determine legal status carries a superficial appeal.  The
promise of anticipating socially harmful behaviors before they occur seems a
progressive and alluring aspiration.  Similarly, the promise of “personalizing”
law so that regulation better fits the circumstances of a given individual seems
instinctively an equitable and attractive proposition.  Yet when one carefully
unpacks the technical, social, and epistemic baggage that such proposals
bring to the legal system, it quickly becomes apparent that the plausibility of
such proposals is indeed superficial.  In particular, such proposals evince lit-
tle awareness that algorithmic processes, far from providing a magical respite
from troublesome information costs, implicate a shift in regulatory commen-
suration from description to discipline.345
Recognizing the deleterious potential of legal metrics does not necessa-
rily preclude any role in democratic society for the use of predictive algo-
rithms.  It is one thing for a municipality to use a predictive algorithm to
343 See, e.g., Susser et al., supra note 213, at 34–44; Yeung, supra note 18, at 267–68.
344 See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
345 See FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 183–84.
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anticipate snarled vehicular traffic so as to place stop lights; it is quite
another thing for a municipality to use a predictive algorithm to anticipate
criminal behavior so as to place police officers.  It is one thing for a hospital
to use a predictive algorithm to determine the most effective medical treat-
ment; it is quite another thing for a court to use a predictive algorithm so as
to determine liability for failed medical treatments.  What I have shown here
is that the performative features of legal metrics are a danger to legal institu-
tions.  Other applications of predictive algorithms in society will have their
own failings, but not necessarily these failings.346
Even within democratic governance systems, there is no reasonable hope
that, whatever their effects, algorithmic legal metrics will not be relied upon,
at least in some situations.  As I have shown at the beginning of the Article,
such reliance is already well underway.347  If nothing else, one has to assume
that budgetary pressures to accomplish more with fewer resources will drive
legal institutions toward the use of algorithmic scoring.348  Thus, tracing the
flawed logic of predictive and personalized law proposals is a crucial under-
taking.  Algorithmic metrics are socially toxic, but much like biologically
toxic substances, they might be useful or even curative if applied in limited
and judicious circumstances.  At a minimum, we will want to limit exposure
to such metrics in order to minimize the harm they will inevitably cause.
Understanding the likely impact of their implementation allows us to identify
the harms they will inflict if deployed, and to begin identifying situations
where such harms are sufficiently repellant that selective curtailment of
algorithmic predictions is vital.
346 See, e.g., William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 337,
375 (2020) (arguing that machine learning systems in the finance sector will amplify
human error).
347 See supra notes 4–11 and accompanying text.
348 See Yeung, supra note 3, at 514.
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